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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF SECTION 10(B): A
WOLF HUNT OFF WALL STREET
ABSTRACT
Born to combat the market effects of the Great Depression, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 protects American investors and maintains American
confidence in the U.S. securities market. These objectives are largely
accomplished through the imposition of liability from Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and the SEC’s Rule 10b-5. These federal laws impose
civil and criminal penalties for domestic insider trading and securities fraud
violations. Because Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only apply domestically, when
securities violations occur both within the United States and abroad, the reach
of federal law becomes questionable, leaving federal courts with a complex
issue.
To resolve this issue, the Second Circuit created a Conduct and Effects test
that left federal courts with a subpar solution to determine when Section 10(b)
may apply extraterritorially. The test developed for over forty years and was
widely accepted until the Supreme Court, in Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, Ltd., brought Section 10(b)’s extraterritorial reach to a screeching halt
in 2010. Ushering in a fundamental shift in securities law, Justice Scalia
abrogated the Second Circuit’s Conduct and Effects test and purported to
provide a clear Transactional test that avoided interference with foreign
securities regulation. But the Court missed the mark, and instead created two
new issues for the circuit courts of appeals. First, the Transactional test created
an ambiguity that resulted in a sharply divided split among the First, Second,
Third, and Ninth Circuit Courts. Second, the simultaneous enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Act prompted a question of whether Congress partially abrogated
the Court’s decision in Morrison and reinstated the Conduct and Effects test.
In the wake of this circuit split comes uncertainty among the lower courts,
threats to stare decisis, plaintiffs avoiding a defendant-friendly Second Circuit
by forum shopping, and strains on international comity. To resolve the split, this
Comment sets forth a factor-balancing test that determines whether the foreign
elements of a transaction overcome the domestic elements to render Section
10(b) inapplicable to the conduct. This Spectrum test provides a flexible, but
narrowly tailored, framework that can adapt to a rapidly evolving and
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globalizing securities market. It provides courts with a workable and consistent
analysis that will facilitate the development of Section 10(b) jurisprudence.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 439
I. A NEW DEAL .................................................................................. 441
A. Combatting the Great Crash ................................................... 442
B. Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .... 444
1. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ........ 445
2. Rule 10b-5 ........................................................................ 446
3. Private Actions Versus Public Actions ............................... 447
II. SECTION 10(B)’S RALLY ABROAD ................................................... 447
A. The Effects Test ...................................................................... 448
B. The Conduct Test .................................................................... 449
III. A HALT IN EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH .......................................... 450
A. Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd. ............................... 451
B. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act ......................................................................... 455
1. The Tenth Circuit—SEC v. Scoville .................................. 456
2. Congress Failed to Extend Section 10(b)’s Scope for Public
Actions .............................................................................. 457
IV. VOLATILITY IN THE CIRCUITS ......................................................... 459
A. The Second Circuit Takes on Morrison .................................... 460
1. The Irrevocable Liability Test ........................................... 460
2. The So Predominantly Foreign Test .................................. 462
B. The Other Side of the Circuit Split .......................................... 467
1. The Third Circuit—United States v. Georgiou ................... 468
2. The Ninth Circuit—Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp. ...................... 470
3. The First Circuit—SEC v. Morrone ................................... 472
V. IPO OF THE SPECTRUM TEST ........................................................... 476
A. Spectrum Test Framework ...................................................... 477
B. Spectrum Test in Action .......................................................... 481
1. Application to Parkcentral ................................................. 482
2. Application to Morrone ..................................................... 484
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 486

2022]

A WOLF HUNT OFF WALL STREET

439

INTRODUCTION
Federal securities laws protect American investors from securities fraud,
insider trading, and other deceptive practices.1 In the context of a rapidly
evolving and globalizing securities market,2 determining the reach of that
protection can be difficult.3 When a securities transaction occurs, it may occur
solely inside the United States, or it may involve parties abroad. 4 But when the
transaction occurs both inside and outside the United States, it raises a complex
issue for federal courts due to the common law presumption against
extraterritoriality. This canon of construction presumes that when Congress
legislates, it does so for domestic matters as opposed to foreign matters unless
Congress clearly indicates otherwise.5
In 2010, the Supreme Court determined that the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, and it does
not apply extraterritorially.6 Consequently, the Court gave a Transactional test
to determine when a transaction is domestic in order to impose liability for
violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.7 The Court did not
provide guidance in applying the Transactional test,8 which naturally gave rise
to a split among the First, Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals. 9
1 See
Securities
Law
History,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_law_history (last visited Jan. 2, 2022).
2 “Globalization has influenced international investing, making it easier than ever before, historically, for
market participants to invest in companies, industries, or other financial instruments abroad.” Mary Hall,
Globalization
and
International
Investment,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/022615/what-effect-has-globalization-had-internationalinvestments.asp (Aug. 31, 2022). “Market participants can buy stocks, mutual funds, exchange-traded funds
(ETFs) or American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) to gain access to the shares of internationally-based
companies.” Id.
3 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 260 (2010) (“Commentators have criticized the
unpredictable and inconsistent application of § 10(b) to transnational cases.” (citations omitted)).
4 See SEC v. Morrone, 997 F.3d 52, 54–55, 58 (1st Cir. 2021) (involving American defendants and private
foreign investors).
5 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (first citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204, n.5 (1993); and
then quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
6 Id. at 265.
7
See id. at 273.
8 See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012) (“While
Morrison holds that § 10(b) can be applied to domestic purchases or sales, it provides little guidance as to what
constitutes a domestic purchase or sale.”).
9 See Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 216–17 (2d Cir. 2014)
(determining federal securities laws did not apply because “the claims . . . [were] so predominantly foreign as to
be impermissibly extraterritorial”); Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp., 896 F.3d 933, 950 (9th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the
Second Circuit’s approach); Morrone, 997 F.3d at 60 (citing Stoyas, 896 F.3d at 950) (joining the Ninth Circuit
in rejecting the Second Circuit’s approach); United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 137 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We
now hold that irrevocable liability establishes the location of a securities transaction.”).
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Congress then added to the chaos by enacting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Because the Dodd-Frank Act was passed
nearly simultaneously with the Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
decision’s release,10 another ambiguity arose causing the circuit courts to
question whether Congress partially abrogated Morrison and reinstated the
Conduct and Effects test.11 Several crucial issues arise from the circuit courts’
interpretations of Morrison, including inconsistent decisions,12 strains on
international comity,13 threats to stare decisis,14 and forum shopping.15
This Comment addresses the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (“SEC”) Rule 10b-5 and provides a new framework for the
analysis to resolve these respective issues. In Part I, this Comment discusses the
social and economic background16 that the Securities Exchange Act was
legislated against. Part II introduces Section 10(b)’s initial extraterritorial
application and the development of the Conduct and Effects test. Part III
analyzes the Morrison decision and the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Part IV evaluates the circuit courts’
10 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) (showing “Effective Date” as July 21, 2010); Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247 (showing that the Court issued
its decision on June 24, 2010).
11 See SEC v. Scoville, 913 F.3d 1204, 1218 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Notwithstanding the placement of the
Dodd-Frank amendments in the jurisdictional provisions of the securities acts, . . . it is clear to us that Congress
undoubtedly intended that the substantive antifraud provisions [of section 10(b)] should apply extraterritorially
when the statutory conduct-and-effects test is satisfied.”).
12 Compare Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 216 (“[W]e think it clear that the claims in this case are so
predominantly foreign as to be impermissibly extraterritorial.”), with Stoyas, 896 F.3d at 949 (citing Morrison,
561 U.S. at 273 & 251 n.1) (noting a domestic transaction could almost certainly be established).
13 See Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 216 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269) (“[T]he application of § 10(b) to
the defendants would so obviously implicate the incompatibility of U.S. and foreign laws that Congress could
not have intended it sub silentio.”).
14 See Scoville, 913 F.3d at 1215–19 (declining to follow Morrison’s holding that the Securities Exchange
Act does not apply extraterritoriality and applying the Conduct and Effects test to the proceeding brought by the
SEC). The Supreme Court describes stare decisis as “a foundation stone of the rule of law.” Kimble v. Marvel
Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015) (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014)).
Stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Id.
(quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827–28 (1991)).
15 See Jason Halper, Adam Magid & Jonathan Watkins, Securities Litigation Update: First Circuit
Endorses Broad View of Extraterritorial Reach of the Federal Securities Laws, Cementing Split with the Second
Circuit on the Meaning of a “Domestic” Transaction, JDSUPRA (May 26, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/securities-litigation-update-first-1056649/ (“[I]t is likely that private
plaintiffs asserting claims with a foreign nexus will do their best to bypass the Second Circuit and file suit in
more hospitable forums, such as the First and Ninth Circuits.”).
16 This background discussion focuses on the Great Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. See infra Part
I.
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split in the application of the second prong of Morrison’s Transactional test.
Finally, Part V argues for the implementation of the Spectrum test17 to resolve
the split, and demonstrates its application to existing fact patterns adjudicated
by the First and Second Circuits. While the SEC punted on the issue in 2012, 18
the Spectrum test provides a flexible and consistent framework that can adapt to
a rapidly evolving and globalizing securities market.
I. A NEW DEAL
Dancing, prohibition, gangsters, and economic prosperity are staples of the
American era famously known as the Roaring Twenties.19 During the Roaring
Twenties, social mores evolved and public expectations of women changed. 20 It
became socially acceptable for women to dress promiscuously, smoke, drink,
and dance vivaciously in public.21 Throughout this era, dance halls filled and
new dance styles proliferated.22 Contemporaneously, alcohol consumption
increased, despite the alcohol prohibition by the 18th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.23 Americans were not deterred by the prohibition and resorted to a
black market for alcohol.24 Famous gangsters, like Al Capone, bootlegged

17 This Comment introduces the Spectrum test, a novel factor-balancing test that determines whether the
foreign elements of a transaction overcome the domestic elements to render Section 10(b) inapplicable to the
conduct. See infra Part V.
18 In April 2012,
Congress directed the Securities and Exchange Commission to carry out a study “to
determine the extent to which private rights of action under the antifraud provisions of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 . . . should be extended to cover” domestic
conduct in connection with foreign transactions or foreign conduct with domestic
effects.
Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 217 n.14 (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 929Y, 124 Stat 1376,1871 (2010)). Illustrating the complexity of these issues, the result of
that study did not offer any recommended approach and only gave general options regarding how to proceed.
Id. (citation omitted).
19 See History.com Editors, The Roaring Twenties, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/roaringtwenties/roaring-twenties-history (Aug. 12, 2022).
20 See Roaring Twenties, OHIO HIST. CENT., https://ohiohistorycentral.org/w/Roaring_Twenties (last
visited Dec. 31, 2021).
21 See id.
22 See Salman Mohammed, Dance in the 1920s, UNLV PUB. HIST. (Oct. 9, 2016),
https://www.unlvpublichistory.com/new-page-1.
23 Mark Thornton, Alcohol Prohibition Was a Failure, CATO INST. (July 17, 1991),
https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/alcohol-prohibition-was-failure. The 18th Amendment prohibited “the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within” the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII,
§ 1. The 18th Amendment was later repealed by the 21st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI, § 1.
24 See History.com Editors, The Roaring Twenties, supra note 19.
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alcohol through organized crime and were revered as heroes by the public for
their defiance against the government.25
The American economy flourished.26 New household products entered the
market, the number of Americans that owned automobiles rose, and ordinary
people invested in stocks.27 The stock market rapidly expanded, and stock prices
rose to historic levels.28 Optimistic speculation in the market reigned, and
hundreds of millions of shares of stock were financed by bank loans, which were
expected to be repaid by the anticipated profits from the stock transactions. 29
Anticipated profits fell short, however, preventing lenders from recovering loan
amounts and shattering confidence in the U.S. economy.30
In 1929, the United States faced the Great Crash and, soon after, the Great
Depression, eviscerating the success of the Roaring Twenties.31 These historic
events led President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to organize the New Deal.32 The
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 arose from the
New Deal and are the two most significant U.S. federal securities statutes. 33
A. Combatting the Great Crash
The Great Crash of 1929 marks the record decline in the American stock
market.34 During this decline, the most severe drop occurred on October 29,
1929, more commonly known as “Black Tuesday.”35 That day, over 16 million
shares were sold on the New York Stock Exchange, which caused stock prices
to collapse and investors to lose billions of dollars.36 Although these massive

25 See Laura Martisiute, 26 Famous Gangsters from the Height of the Public Enemy Era, ATI,
https://allthatsinteresting.com/famous-gangsters-1920s#3 (Jan. 30, 2019).
26 See History.com Editors, The Roaring Twenties, supra note 19.
27 See id.; The Roaring 20s, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/crash-roaring20s/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2021); Brian Duignan, Causes of the Great Depression, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/story/causes-of-the-great-depression (last visited Jan. 2, 2022).
28 See Duignan, supra note 27.
29
See id.
30 See id.
31 See History.com Editors, Stock Market Crash of 1929, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/greatdepression/1929-stock-market-crash (Aug. 12, 2022).
32 Great Depression, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/great-depression (last visited Jan. 2, 2022).
33 DAVID G. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. FREER, MICHAEL J. ROBERTS & GEORGE B. SHEPHERD, BUSINESS
STRUCTURES 449 (5th ed. 2019).
34 See History.com Editors, Stock Market Crash of 1929, supra note 31.
35 See id.
36 See id.
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losses were not the sole cause of the Great Depression, the Great Crash was a
contributing factor.37
The Great Depression of 1929 is the worst economic downturn in the modern
history of the world and lasted nearly ten years.38 A third of banks in America
failed, unemployment rates reached almost 25%, housing prices fell 67%,
deflation was over 10%, and the stock market lost 90% of its value.39 Overall,
the American economy was devastated.40
In response to this economic crisis, the New Deal was created.41 The New
Deal was a series of reforms enacted to combat the effects of the Great Crash
and the Great Depression, rebuild the economy, and prevent similar economic
crises from occurring in the future.42 Key areas these programs focused on were
the U.S. banking system, agriculture industry, welfare system, public works
projects and job creation, and financial reform in the securities market. 43
The financial reform programs emphasized restoring investor confidence in
the U.S. securities market and sought to prevent a future stock market crash like
the Great Crash.44 To prevent another financial catastrophe, the financial reforms
addressed the main causes of the Great Crash45—the primary cause being abuses
in the American stock market that engendered its rapid expansion during the
Roaring Twenties.46 Abuses in the stock market included insider trading, lack of
disclosure of relevant company information to investors, and the unrestricted
purchase of securities on margin.47 These abuses were able to proceed because,

37

See id.
See Duignan, supra note 27.
39 See Kimberly Amadeo, 9 Principal Effects of the Great Depression, THE BALANCE,
https://www.thebalancemoney.com/effects-of-the-great-depression-4049299 (Mar. 27, 2022); Tom Nicholas &
Anna Scherbina, Real Estate Prices During the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression, 41 REAL EST.
ECON. 278, 278 (2013).
40 See Amadeo, supra note 39.
41 The New Deal, COURSE HERO, https://www.coursehero.com/study-guides/boundless-ushistory/the-newdeal/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2022).
42 See id.
43
See id.
44 See History.com Editors, SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission, HIST. (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://www.history.com/topics/us-government/securities-and-exchange-commission.
45 See, e.g., id.; Securities Law History, supra note 1.
46 See History.com Editors, SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 44; Securities Law
History, supra note 1.
47 See History.com Editors, SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 44; Securities Law
History, supra note 1. These abuses also included widespread fraud and unsupported promises of large profits
that misled investors. See History.com Editors, SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 44;
Securities Law History, supra note 1.
38
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at the time, securities regulation was “virtually nonexistent.”48 Without
regulation, these abuses created a “speculative frenzy” that drove the expansion
of the market and eventually led to a widespread panic causing investors to
liquidate their investments, infamously known as the Great Crash.49
For the first time in American history, with the implementation of the New
Deal, federal regulation was imposed over the securities market to prevent these
abuses and protect investors.50 Federal securities regulation protects investors
by requiring companies that issue securities to disclose “detailed information to
investors about themselves” and their securities, and by permitting investors to
sue companies that used false or misleading information to sell their securities.51
These protections are enforced through the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, each of which will be addressed in turn. 52
B. Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Securities Act of 1933 “governs the issuance of securities” by
companies53 and has two main objectives: (1) ensuring investors receive certain
relevant information related to the sale of securities; and (2) prohibiting fraud in
the sale of the securities.54 These objectives are accomplished through the
Securities Act’s disclosure and registration requirements.55 Requiring
companies to comply with disclosure and registration requirements provides
investors with financial transparency to make informed investment decisions

48 See History.com Editors, SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 44. Most states did
have their own securities laws, known as “Blue Sky Laws.” See Securities Law History, supra note 1. The state
securities laws are called Blue Sky Laws “because the laws protect against shady promoters who would sell
stock by promising the buyer the whole blue sky.” EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 450. However, Blue Sky
Laws “were mostly ineffective.” History.com Editors, SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note
44.
49 See Securities Law History, supra note 1.
50 See The New Deal, supra note 41 (“For the first time in American history, the government was directly
involved in reforming and regulating the economy.”).
51 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 449.
52
See Securities Law History, supra note 1.
53 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 449.
54 The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introductioninvesting/investing-basics/role-sec/laws-govern-securities-industry (last visited Jan. 2, 2022). A security is “any
note, stock, treasury stock, bond, . . . investment contract, . . . any interest or instrument commonly known as a
‘security,’ or any certificate of interest or participation in, . . . or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any
of the foregoing.” SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 n.3 (1946) (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1)).
55 See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 54. Generally, registration forms require
a “description of the company’s properties and business[,] a description of the security to be offered for sale,”
information about company management, and “financial statements certified by independent accountants.” Id.
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and an avenue of recovery if deceived by companies while making those
decisions.56
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governs new securities and resales of
securities in the secondary market by requiring companies to continually
“provide detailed public reports about their operations”57 and creating the SEC
to ensure its enforcement.58 The SEC is a federal agency that has the authority
to regulate the U.S. securities market by promulgating and enforcing rules
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act.59 Federal courts possess exclusive
jurisdiction over cases arising from violations of the Securities Exchange Act
and the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to it.60
In accordance with the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act, the SEC’s
mission is to protect investors by overseeing the U.S. securities market.61 Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is the primary anti-fraud statutory
provision and is enforced by the SEC’s promulgated Rule 10b-5.62
1. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
When determining the application of Section 10(b) to extraterritorial
conduct, the focus of the anti-fraud provision is on the purchase and sale of
securities in the United States.63 Accordingly, this Comment focuses on Section
10(b)’s language, “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.”64
Section 10(b) provides:

56

See id.
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 449. The SEC requires companies to file reports, forms, and other
information to a searchable, online database called EDGAR. History.com Editors, SEC: Securities and Exchange
Commission, supra note 44.
58 See History.com Editors, SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 44.
59
See id.
60 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a).
61 See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/what-we-do (last visited Jan.
2, 2022). In describing its mission, the SEC states on its website that “[f]or more than 85 years since our founding
at the height of the Great Depression, we have stayed true to our mission of protecting investors, maintaining
fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation.” Id.
62 See
Securities
Exchange
Act
of
1934,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_exchange_act_of_1934 (last visited Jan. 2, 2022).
63 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–67 (2010).
64 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
57
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement[,] any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.65

2. Rule 10b-5
In 1948, Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the SEC under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act.66 Rule 10b-5 broadly protects against securities fraud,
insider trading, and other deceptive practices.67 The rule is considered “a
bedrock of protection for those who purchase and sell securities. Every securities
transaction lives under its protective shade and menacing shadow.”68
Significantly, because Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b),
the extent of its application is limited to the extraterritorial conduct reached by
Section 10(b).69
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,

65
66
67
68

Id. § 78j (emphasis added).
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 455.
See id. at 455, 475.
Id. at 455 (quoting ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS—EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 413 (6th ed.

2009)).
69

See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261–62.
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in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.70

3. Private Actions Versus Public Actions
Rule 10b-5 is among the most litigated federal law provisions and has had
more private securities actions brought under it than any other securities law in
the last twenty-five years.71 Although Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not
explicitly provide for private causes of action for violations, private causes of
action developed through judicial application and legislative acquiescence, and
are well-established in the law.72
Public actions by the SEC and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) may also
be brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.73 SEC actions under these
provisions are civil actions, and can result in monetary remedies, injunctions,
and restrictions on participation in the securities industry.74 Conversely, the DOJ
can institute criminal charges for violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.75
II. SECTION 10(B)’S RALLY ABROAD
Creating a private cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was
one of the most significant decisions in the history of securities law. 76 The
Second Circuit was first to recognize this right,77 and has since led the
development of Section 10(b) jurisprudence.78 Part of this development included

70

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2021).
STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR SMALL & EMERGING C OMPANIES § 19:8, Westlaw
(database updated Oct. 2021).
72 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230–31 (1988) (citations omitted).
73 See
Brenda
Hamilton,
SEC
Rule
10b-5,
SEC.
LAW.
101,
https://www.securitieslawyer101.com/2013/rule-10b-5/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2022).
74 See Investor Bulletin: SEC Investigations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. C OMM’ N (Oct. 22, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_investigations.
75 See Hamilton, supra note 73. In United States v. Georgiou, Georgiou engaged in a stock fraud scheme
that manipulated the markets of four stocks. 777 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 2015). Consequently, the United States
instituted a criminal proceeding for violation of, among other things, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See id. at
132.
76 Karen Patton Seymour, Securities and Financial Regulation in the Second Circuit, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
225, 229 (2016). Since the enactment of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act as part of the New
Deal, “the Second Circuit has been the leading interpreter of U.S. securities laws and arguably the most
influential court in the area of securities regulation in the world.” Id. at 225.
77 Id. at 226 (citation omitted).
78 See id. at 232. No other court has been more influential in securities law than the Second Circuit. See id.
at 225. At least partially due to its location in the largest securities market in the world, New York City, the
Second Circuit has gained unparalleled experience in the area and commands preeminence in securities law. See
id. at 225–26 (citation omitted). During one period, the court “was responsible for one-third of all securities
71
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creating the standard for determining the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b). 79
For this analysis, the Second Circuit implemented the Conduct and Effects test.80
The Conduct test asks “whether ‘substantial acts in furtherance of the fraud were
committed within the United States[,]’” and the Effects test asks “whether the
wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon [U.S.]
citizens[.]”81 Generally, if either of the tests was satisfied, then Section 10(b)
could reach the challenged conduct and apply extraterritorially. 82 Although these
tests were created separately, they were later combined and applied together to
determine whether a federal court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction to
adjudicate a case.83
A. The Effects Test
During the 1960s, the Second Circuit began its long line of Section 10(b)
jurisprudence by developing its Effects test.84 In 1968, the Second Circuit
created the Effects test to determine when challenged conduct would warrant
assertion of jurisdiction by federal courts under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.85 In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, an American shareholder of Banff Oil,
Ltd., a Canadian corporation that conducted all of its business in Canada,
brought a derivative action against Banff Oil’s board of directors for damages to
Banff Oil resulting from the sale of Banff’s treasury stock to another Canadian
corporation.86 Because fraud in Canada giving Banff Oil inadequate
consideration for its stocks would lower the bid price for Banff’s shares traded

opinions issued by” the circuit courts, and its decisions comprised up to “70 percent of opinions [published] in
securities law casebooks.” Id. at 225 (citation omitted).
79 See id. at 232 (citation omitted).
80 See id.
81 Id. at 232 n.67 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
82 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 257 (2010) (“The Second Circuit had thus
established that application of § 10(b) could be premised upon either some effect on American securities markets
or investors (Schoenbaum) or significant conduct in the United States (Leasco).”).
83 See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247;
SEC v. Scoville, 913 F.3d 1204, 1216 (10th Cir. 2019) (“The courts of appeals treated application of the conductand-effects test to decide when the federal securities acts applied extraterritorially as a matter of subject-matter
jurisdiction.” (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 253–54, 257–60)).
84 See Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud Protection in an
Internationalized Securities Marketplace, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 241 (1992).
85 See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208–09 (2d Cir. 1968) (citations omitted), abrogated by
Morrison, 561 U.S. 247.
86 Id. at 204–05. “The derivative action is the common law’s inventive solution to the problem of actions
to protect shareholder interests.” Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982). “[A] derivative suit involves
two actions brought by an individual shareholder: (i) an action against the corporation for failing to bring a
specified suit and (ii) an action on behalf of the corporation for harm to it identical to the one which the
corporation failed to bring.” Id. (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970)).
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in America, the court found a “sufficiently serious effect” to warrant assertion
of jurisdiction and consider the merits of the American investor’s claims against
the Canadian corporation’s board of directors.87
The Second Circuit claimed it had subject-matter jurisdiction because it
determined the Securities Exchange Act does have extraterritorial application. 88
The court reasoned that neither the presumption against extraterritoriality nor
the “language in Section 30(b) show[ed] Congressional intent to preclude
application of the Exchange Act to transactions regarding stocks traded in the
United States which are effected outside the United States, when extraterritorial
application of the Act is necessary to protect American investors.”89 According
to the court, when the Effects test was satisfied, Section 10(b) could apply
extraterritorially.90
B. The Conduct Test
Four years later, the Second Circuit developed the Conduct test.91 In Leasco
v. Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, an American company
suffered damages from securities fraud in connection with securities exchanged
in England.92 The securities were not listed on an American domestic exchange,
but some of the challenged conduct occurred in the United States. 93 Section
10(b) applied to the transaction in Leasco because misrepresentations inducing
the American corporation to purchase the shares were made in the United States
and constituted substantial acts in furtherance of the fraud. 94 For the Second
Circuit, this was sufficient to trigger Section 10(b) liability even though

87

See Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208–09 (citations omitted).
Id. at 206.
89 Id. In its analysis of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Second Circuit seemed to disregard the presumption
against extraterritoriality. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 256 (2010) (citing Schoenbaum,
405 F.2d at 206). Instead of looking for affirmative language to overcome the presumption, it relied on the lack
of congressional intent to preclude application of the Securities Exchange Act extraterritorially when its Effects
test was met. See Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
90
See Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206 (“In our view, neither the usual presumption against extraterritorial
application of legislation nor the specific language of Section 30(b) show Congressional intent to preclude
application of the Exchange Act to transactions regarding stocks traded in the United States which are effected
outside the United States, when extraterritorial application of the Act is necessary to protect American
investors.”).
91 See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334–36 (2d Cir. 1972), abrogated
by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257.
92 See 468 F.2d at 1330; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 256.
93 See Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334–35; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 256–57.
94 Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1337.
88
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misrepresentations were also made in England, and the shares were transferred
there as well.95
The Second Circuit’s analysis again disregarded the presumption against
extraterritoriality and expanded Section 10(b)’s reach abroad. 96 The Second
Circuit replaced the presumption with an inquiry into whether it would be
reasonable to apply Section 10(b) to the challenged conduct in question, which
essentially looked into congressional intent to determine if Congress would want
the courts to use their resources to address a particular case. 97 If either of the
Conduct or Effects tests was satisfied, then Congress intended Section 10(b) to
cover the challenged conduct.98 This allowed Section 10(b) to be applied to even
“predominantly foreign” transactions.99 The Second Circuit later combined the
Conduct and Effects tests into one test because it believed the combination
provided better insight in evaluating whether the federal courts should adjudicate
a particular case.100
III. A HALT IN EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH
In 2010, the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison brought the Second
Circuit’s Section 10(b) jurisprudence to a screeching halt.101 This Supreme
Court decision, delivered by Justice Scalia, ushered in a “fundamental shift in
securities law.”102 After forty years of Section 10(b) extraterritorial applicability
jurisprudence,103 the Supreme Court changed the issue from a question of
subject-matter jurisdiction to one of the merits of the claim, and incorporated a
new two-step approach to the issue.104 The two-step analysis eliminated the
Conduct and Effects test and replaced it with a bright-line Transactional test that
95 See Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334–36, 1339; Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir.
1975), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247.
96 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257 (citing Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985).
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 See id. (quoting Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985).
100 See id. at 258 (citing Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995)).
101 See SEC v. Scoville, 913 F.3d 1204, 1217 (10th Cir. 2019) (noting that Morrison’s holding was contrary
to decades of circuit-level case law). The Second Circuit’s Conduct and Effects test “is a much easier standard
to meet than the narrower domestic-applicability test articulated in Morrison. In a global marketplace, it can
almost always be argued that the purchase or sale of securities occurring outside of the U.S. has a foreseeable
substantial effect in the U.S.” JENNIFER ACHILLES & AARON CHASE, REED SMITH LLP, SEC V. SCOVILLE: THE
TENTH CIRCUIT REVIVES EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 4 (2019),
https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2019/03/sec-v-scoville-the-tenth-circuit-revives-extraterritorialapplication.
102 Scoville, 913 F.3d at 1218.
103 See id. at 1216.
104 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269–70.
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determines whether a transaction is domestic.105 The Court’s decision to shift
the issue to a question of merit gave rise to an issue with the Dodd-Frank Act,106
and the Transactional test created ambiguity among the circuits as to whether a
domestic transaction was sufficient to trigger Section 10(b) applicability or just
a threshold requirement.107
A. Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.
Although the Second Circuit called upon Congress to speak on the issue of
Section 10(b)’s extraterritorial application when it adjudicated Morrison, 108 the
Supreme Court decided to address the case.109 In Morrison, Australian investors
purchased shares of National Australia Bank, which were publicly traded on the
Australian Stock Exchange Limited.110 National Australia Bank allegedly
committed securities fraud, and, as a result, the Australian investors brought suit
in the Southern District of New York.111 National Australia Bank moved to
dismiss the private action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to

105 See id. “The Commonwealth of Australia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the Republic of France . . . filed amicus briefs in [Morrison].” Id. at 269. “They all complain[ed] of the
interference with foreign securities regulation that application of § 10(b) abroad would produce, and urge[d] the
adoption of a clear test that [would] avoid that consequence.” Id. According to the Court, the Transactional test
met that requirement. Id. at 269–70.
106 See Scoville, 913 F.3d at 1217–18 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254–55) (noting that Morrison “held
that the question of the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) did not implicate a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction”
and that Congress only amended the jurisdictional sections of the Dodd-Frank Act).
107 See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012) (“While
Morrison holds that § 10(b) can be applied to domestic purchases or sales, it provides little guidance as to what
constitutes a domestic purchase or sale.”).
108 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 n.4 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 561 U.S. 247, 273
(2010).
109 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 253 (granting certiorari).
110 Id. at 251–52. The bank did not have shares listed on a U.S. exchange; however, the bank did have
American depositary receipts listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 251. The American depository
receipts were derivatives, representing the right to receive a specified number of National Australia Bank’s
shares listed on the foreign exchange. See id. “[American depositary receipts] are negotiable certificates issued
by a United States depositary institution, typically banks, and they represent a beneficial interest in, but not legal
title of, a specified number of shares of a non-United States company.” Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp., 896 F.3d 933,
940 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). “The depositary institution itself maintains custody over the foreign
company’s shares. Id. “[American depositary receipts] ‘allow U.S. investors to invest in non-U.S. companies
and give non-U.S. companies easier access to U.S. capital markets.’” Id. (quoting SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFF.
OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOC., INVESTOR BULLETIN: AMERICAN DEPOSITORY RECEIPTS 1 (2012)).
111 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 252. National Australia Bank purchased a company headquartered in Florida and
included the value of the Florida company’s assets on its financial statements. Id. at 251. From 1998 to 2001,
National Australia Bank’s annual reports and other public documents flaunted the Florida company’s success.
Id.
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state a claim.112 The district court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, the Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.113
The Supreme Court addressed two overarching issues.114 First, the Supreme
Court corrected the lower courts’ interpretation of the type of issue raised by the
question of Section 10(b)’s extraterritorial reach.115 Second, the Court addressed
whether Section 10(b) applies to actions brought by foreign plaintiffs suing
foreign defendants for fraudulent conduct related to securities listed on foreign
exchanges.116
As to the first issue, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts incorrectly
considered the question of Section 10(b)’s extraterritorial reach to be an issue of
subject-matter jurisdiction.117 Justice Scalia, who authored the opinion, reasoned
that determining the conduct that Section 10(b) reaches is equivalent to
determining the conduct that Section 10(b) prohibits—a merits-based question
rather than one of subject-matter jurisdiction.118 Moreover, the district court
already possessed the “power to hear [the] case” because Congress granted
exclusive jurisdiction to federal district courts under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa to
adjudicate violations arising from the Securities Exchange Act. 119
Next, the Court addressed the second issue on the merits.120 The Court began
its analysis by raising the presumption against extraterritoriality canon of
statutory construction.121 The presumption against extraterritoriality states that
“[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it
has none.”122 The presumption exists because Congress ordinarily legislates
regarding domestic matters instead of foreign matters.123
112 Id. at 253. In July 2001, National Australia Bank reduced the recognized value of its acquired Florida
company’s assets by $450 million and then, just two months later, wrote down an additional $1.75 billion. Id. at
252. National Australia Bank downplayed the first write down and blamed the second on mistaken assumptions
and “a failure to anticipate the lowering of prevailing interest rates.” Id.
113 Id. at 253.
114 Id. at 250–51, 253.
115 Id. at 253.
116
Id. at 250–51.
117 Id. at 253–54.
118 Id. at 254.
119 See id. at 254 & n.3 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 81 (2009)). It was
unnecessary to remand the case because the label of the dismissal did not affect the lower courts’ analyses. Id.
at 254.
120 See id. at 255.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)).
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The Court recognized the lower courts’ analyses deviated from this
longstanding presumption and that they applied an unreliable test—the Second
Circuit’s Conduct and Effects test—that attempted to discern whether Congress
sought to have Section 10(b) apply in each specific case.124 Variations of the
Conduct and Effects test had been applied in the lower courts for decades,
determining the application of the Securities Exchange Act to fraudulent
schemes that involved conduct abroad.125
The Morrison Court criticized the Conduct and Effects test for, among other
things, its lack of textual support in the Securities Exchange Act and its
inconsistent application.126 Justice Scalia found that the Conduct and Effects test
was based on the flawed premise that, because Congress was silent on the
extraterritorial application of Section 10(b), courts were left to determine what
Congress envisioned.127 The Court also pointed out that the Second Circuit
admitted that factors that were significant to the application of the test in past
cases would not necessarily be dispositive in future cases.128 Consequently, the
Court put an end to the “judicial-speculation” into Congress’s intent and
provided Congress “a stable background” to legislate against. 129 The Supreme
Court abrogated the Conduct and Effects test and revived the presumption
against extraterritoriality in the Section 10(b) analysis.130
This transition ostensibly streamlined the Conduct and Effects test into a
two-step analysis.131 The two-step analysis first applies the presumption against
extraterritoriality to a statute and determines whether there is a clear indication
that Congress intended the statute to apply extraterritorially. 132 Then, because
the Securities Exchange Act does not rebut the presumption and is limited to

124

Id.
See id.
126 Id. at 258.
127 See id. at 260–61.
128 Id. at 258–59 (citing IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980)).
129 Id. at 261.
130
See id. at 261, 273 (“Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase
or sale of any other security in the United States.”).
131 Under the Morrison two-step analysis, a federal statute applies to a case’s challenged conduct if the
presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted or if the challenged conduct only requires domestic
application of the statute. See SEC v. Scoville, 913 F.3d 1204, 1215 (10th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
132 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265, 267 n.9 (“If § 10(b) did apply abroad, we would not need to determine
which transnational frauds it applied to; it would apply to all of them. . . . Thus, although it is true . . . that our
threshold conclusion that § 10(b) has no extraterritorial effect does not resolve this case, it is a necessary first
step in the analysis.”).
125
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domestic application, the second step applies the Court’s Transactional test to
assess whether the alleged conduct qualifies as domestic under Section 10(b). 133
As to the first step, the Court determined that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied to Section 10(b) and was not rebutted because the
statute lacked a clear indication that it was to apply extraterritorially. 134 In its
reasoning, the Court dismissed three arguments that were in favor of Section
10(b)’s application extraterritorially.135 Each of these arguments failed because
the Securities Exchange Act lacks affirmative indication that it is to apply
extraterritorially.136
With respect to the second step, the Court concluded that Section 10(b) did
not apply to the conduct of National Australia Bank.137 The Court reasoned,
“Section 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, but only deceptive conduct
‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered.’”138 The focus of Section
10(b) is directed to the purchases and sales of securities in the United States
rather than where the deception originated.139
According to the Court, Congress’s focus is limited to domestic
transactions.140 Because the statute seeks to regulate domestic transactions and
protect parties to those transactions,141 “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with [(1)]
the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and

133 See id. at 266–67. Morrison created the Transactional test. See id. at 285 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
134 See id. at 265 (majority opinion).
135 See id. at 262–64. First, the Court determined that general reference to foreign commerce in the statute’s
definition of “interstate commerce” was insufficient to defeat the presumption. Id. at 262–63. Second, the
Securities Exchange Act’s reference to the dissemination and quotation abroad of the prices of securities traded
in domestic exchanges and markets was insufficient because there was no indication that the “national public
interest pertains to transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and markets.” Id. at 263. Third, language in
another section of the Exchange Act addressing situations warranting extraterritorial application lent support to
the argument against Section 10(b)’s extraterritorial application because it would constitute surplusage for
Congress to include that language if the entire Exchange Act already applied extraterritorially. Id. at 263–65.
136 Id. at 265.
137 See id. at 273.
138 Id. at 266 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).
139 Id. at 266. The Court reasoned that “[t]he probability of incompatibility with the applicable laws of other
countries is so obvious that if Congress intended such foreign application ‘it would have addressed the subject
of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures.’” Id. at 269 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 256 (1991)).
140 See id. at 266.
141 Id. at 266–67.
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[(2)] the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”142 The case
failed both of these prongs because it did not involve securities listed on a
domestic exchange, and all aspects of the purchases complained of by the
Australian investors occurred outside the United States.143 Thus, the transactions
were not domestic and, accordingly, were out of Section 10(b)’s reach.144
In Justice Stevens’ concurrence, he argued the Court came to the correct
conclusion but employed a flawed analysis.145 Justice Stevens concluded the
Court upended decades of securities law in favor of a bright-line test that
rendered Section 10(b) “toothless.”146 With the new Transactional test,
defrauders could escape liability for private actions on technicalities by
consummating transactions of securities not listed on domestic exchanges
overseas.147 Further, Justice Stevens determined the Court’s opinion only
applied to private actions brought under Section 10(b) and did not apply to
actions brought by the SEC, appearing to anticipate a significant forthcoming
issue.148
B. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
Nearly simultaneously with the Morrison decision, Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.149 In the DoddFrank Act, Congress granted federal courts jurisdiction over public actions
brought by the SEC and DOJ for violations of Section 10(b) that satisfy the
Conduct and Effects test.150 The issue that arises from the passage of the DoddFrank Act is whether Congress extended Section 10(b)’s reach to apply
extraterritorially, despite Morrison, and reinstated the Conduct and Effects test
for public actions.151 The answer is unclear because Morrison altered the

142

Id. at 273.
Id. Even though the Florida company’s financial models were allegedly manipulated in Florida and the
misleading statements were also allegedly made in that state, Section 10(b) did not reach that conduct. Id. at
251–52, 273. Additionally, it is worth noting the Court did not comment on the applicability of Section 10(b) to
the American investor’s complaint regarding the American depositary receipt listed on the New York Stock
Exchange since that complaint was dismissed by the District Court for failure to allege damages. See id. at 252
n.1.
144 See id. at 273.
145 See id. at 274 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
146 See id. at 285–86 (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 175 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
147 See id. at 285.
148 See id. at 284 n.12.
149 See SEC v. Scoville, 913 F.3d 1204, 1216–18 (10th Cir. 2019).
150 See id. at 1215.
151 See id. at 1215, 1218.
143
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question of Section 10(b)’s applicability to one of merit rather than
jurisdiction.152 Thus, arguably, that section of the Dodd-Frank Act had no effect.
The Tenth Circuit addressed this question in 2019.153
1. The Tenth Circuit—SEC v. Scoville
The Tenth Circuit took a position in favor of extraterritorial application of
Section 10(b) for actions brought by the SEC and the DOJ.154 In 2019, the Tenth
Circuit determined the Dodd-Frank Act partially abrogated Morrison and
granted Section 10(b) extraterritorial application for actions brought by the SEC
and the DOJ that satisfy the Conduct and Effects test.155
Under the Morrison two-step analysis, a federal statute applies to a case’s
challenged conduct if “the presumption against extraterritoriality has been
rebutted” or if the challenged conduct only requires “domestic application of the
statute.”156 The Tenth Circuit decided Section 10(b) applied under the first
step157 and determined the presumption against extraterritoriality was rebutted
because, by Congress’s enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, there was affirmative
and unmistakable congressional intent that Section 10(b) applies
extraterritorially when the challenged conduct satisfies the Conduct and Effects
test.158
The Tenth Circuit determined that the Dodd-Frank Act succeeded in
extending Section 10(b)’s reach due to Morrison’s deviation from the
longstanding precedent of treating its applicability as a subject-matter
jurisdiction question and the unfortunate timing of the decision.159 The court
found that Morrison was issued too late in the legislative process to reasonably
permit Congress to amend a finalized version of a “massive 850-page omnibus
bill designed to overhaul large swaths of the United States financial
regulations.”160 The court took the position that Congress lacked sufficient

152

See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254.
See Scoville, 913 F.3d at 1215 (“Congress has provided that the antifraud provisions apply
extraterritorially when significant steps are taken in the United States to further a violation or conduct occurring
outside the United States has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States[.]”).
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 See id. (quoting WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136 (2018)).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1218.
159 See id. at 1217–18.
160 Id. at 1218.
153
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notice of this “fundamental shift in securities law” to react accordingly, but
Congress may have had more notice of this shift than accredited.161
2. Congress Failed to Extend Section 10(b)’s Scope for Public Actions
The Dodd-Frank Act grants jurisdiction to federal courts for actions or
proceedings brought by the SEC or DOJ for violations of Section 10(b) that meet
the Conduct and Effects test.162 Two considerations arise from this language,
and the second is important because of the potential conflict with the holdings
of Morrison.163 First, the Dodd-Frank Act distinguishes actions brought by the
SEC and the DOJ from private actions.164 Second, the Dodd-Frank Act’s grant
of jurisdiction creates a question of whether Congress intended to extend the
reach of Section 10(b) and, if it did, whether it succeeded. 165 If Congress did
succeed, then Morrison’s holding would only apply to private actions under
Section 10(b) and not public actions.166
Regarding the second consideration, the Tenth Circuit’s argument that
Congress intended to extend the reach of Section 10(b) is compelling,
considering the title of the relevant section in the Dodd-Frank Act is
“S[trengthening] E[nforcement] B[y] [the] C[ommission].”167 However,
whether Congress succeeded is largely questionable. The Dodd-Frank Act
purports to extend federal courts’ jurisdiction, but Morrison determined that
U.S. courts already have jurisdiction over extraterritorial Section 10(b) claims
and whether Section 10(b) applied extraterritorially goes to the merits of the
claim rather than a question of subject-matter jurisdiction.168 Thus, arguably, the
Dodd-Frank Act technically granted to federal courts what they already
possessed and, in effect, was inconsequential.169

161 Id. at 1216, 1218 (“In 2006, . . . the Supreme Court addressed the difference between matters that
implicate a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and matters that go, instead, to proving an element of a
claim.”).
162
Id. at 1215.
163 See id. at 1217–18 (“Morrison, then, contrary to forty years of circuit-level law, held that the question
of the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) did not implicate a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction[.] . . . But Congress,
in the Dodd-Frank Act, amended only the jurisdictional sections of the securities laws.”).
164 See id. at 1218.
165 See id.
166 See id. at 1215.
167 See id. at 1218.
168 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010).
169 See id. (noting the District Court already had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa to adjudicate the claim).
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This discrepancy arose due to the timing of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Morrison and the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.170 Morrison and the DoddFrank Act came to different answers for essentially the same question at nearly
the same time.171 Morrison deviated from forty years of “circuit-level” precedent
and changed the issue of Section 10(b)’s applicability away from a jurisdictional
issue.172 However, against the background of the forty years of precedent,
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act and, accordingly, legislated for a broader
reach in terms of jurisdiction.173 The Morrison decision was finalized the same
day that the Dodd-Frank Act completed joint committee review, and the DoddFrank Act was enacted into law less than a month later.174
In its discussion of Morrison, the Tenth Circuit referenced the Supreme
Court’s decision in 2006, Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.175 Arbaugh was not a case
involving securities laws, but it did “address[] the difference between matters
that implicate a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction” and matters that
implicate the merits of a claim.176 Arbaugh held that courts should treat federal
statutory limitations “as non-jurisdictional in character” unless Congress ranks
the restriction as jurisdictional.177 The Court relied on Congress’s placement of
the provision in question in the definitions section of the statute, rather than the
jurisdictional provision, to reach its determination that it was facing a merits
issue.178
Morrison relied on the Arbaugh line of cases in reaching its merits
holding.179 Because Arbaugh was decided four years prior to the Dodd-Frank
Act, the Arbaugh line of cases, coupled with the Supreme Court granting
certiorari in Morrison, should have put Congress on notice of the forthcoming
“fundamental shift in securities law.”180 In light of this notice, courts should not
rule on this ambiguity in a way that abrogates a Supreme Court decision and
erodes stare decisis as a result of Congress failing to take into account a relevant
trend in the law and incorrectly addressing an issue. Therefore, while Congress
may have intended to extend the scope of Section 10(b) with the Dodd-Frank
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

See Scoville, 913 F.3d at 1217–18.
See id. at 1216–18.
Id. at 1217–18.
See id.
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1216 (citing Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006)).
Id. (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503).
Id. (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516).
Id. (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514–15).
Id. at 1217.
See id. at 1216–18.
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Act, it cannot be said that its intention was affirmative and unmistakable as the
Tenth Circuit argued.
“While the Tenth Circuit’s goal of providing clarity to a muddy area of the
law is laudable, Scoville ultimately leaves as many questions as answers and . . .
begs either the Supreme Court or Congress . . . to revisit an important issue of
securities law.”181 The Tenth Circuit has taken the first step toward adding
another circuit split to the existing one arising from interpreting Morrison’s
Transactional test.182 The other circuit courts have not directly faced the DoddFrank issue, but the First and Second Circuits have acknowledged the problem
as they adjudicated securities cases interpreting the Transactional test.183
IV. VOLATILITY IN THE CIRCUITS
Although the Supreme Court in Morrison wished to provide clarity to the
lower courts with a “clear test,”184 it missed the mark. The Supreme Court’s
Morrison decision created a crucial ambiguity concerning the Dodd-Frank Act
and gave rise to a split among the circuit courts in their interpretations and
applications of the second prong of the two-prong Transactional test.
While the First, Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit Courts agree as to what
constitutes a domestic transaction under the second prong of Morrison’s
Transactional test, they differ as to whether it is sufficient to trigger Section
10(b) liability or merely a threshold requirement. For the First, Third, and Ninth
Circuits, if the second prong of Morrison’s Transactional test is satisfied, then
nothing more is required, and Section 10(b) applies to the challenged conduct. 185
Regarding the Second Circuit, even if the second prong of Morrison’s
Transactional test is satisfied and a domestic transaction exists, Section 10(b)
181

ACHILLES & CHASE, supra note 101, at 2.
See id. at 4 (“It could be that the Tenth Circuit seized this case as an opportunity to take the first step
towards a circuit split . . . .”).
183 See SEC v. Morrone, 997 F.3d 52, 60 n.7 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Scoville in its note that “Morrison’s
transactional test only governs conduct occurring before July 22, 2010” in its SEC case); Parkcentral Glob. Hub
Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 211 n.11 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The import of [the Dodd-Frank]
amendment is unclear . . . .”). In Georgiou, the Third Circuit’s case adopting the Irrevocable Liability test, the
court failed to take on the Dodd-Frank issue even though the United States instituted a criminal proceeding
against Georgiou. See 777 F.3d 125, 132 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Following a three-week trial, a jury found Georgiou
guilty of . . . four counts of securities fraud, in violation of Section 10(b) . . . .”).
184 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269 (2010).
185 See Morrone, 997 F.3d at 60 (“We agree . . . that a transaction is domestic . . . if irrevocable liability
occurs in the United States. . . . [W]e reject Parkcentral as inconsistent with Morrison.”); Georgiou, 777 F.3d at
135–37 (concluding irrevocable liability in the United States can satisfy Morrison’s Transactional test); Stoyas
v. Toshiba Corp., 896 F.3d 933, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2018) (adopting the irrevocable liability test and rejecting
Parkcentral as inconsistent with Morrison).
182
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still may not apply if there are significant foreign elements surrounding the
transaction.186 This section analyzes that split in authority.
A. The Second Circuit Takes on Morrison
Morrison failed to provide instruction on how to determine what constitutes
a domestic transaction. The Second Circuit spearheaded this inquiry and
determined that if irrevocable liability occurs within the United States, then there
is a domestic transaction under Morrison.187 Later, a difficult fact pattern pressed
the boundaries of the Irrevocable Liability test and compelled the Second Circuit
to expand the analysis.188 Due to overwhelming foreign elements, the court
concluded a domestic transaction is only a threshold requirement to invoking
Section 10(b) liability.189 This section analyzes the Second Circuit’s
development of its Irrevocable Liability test and So Predominantly Foreign test.
1. The Irrevocable Liability Test
Fittingly, because the Second Circuit enjoys “preeminence in the field of
securities law,”190 it established the original standard for interpreting the second
prong of the Supreme Court’s Transactional test.191 Two years after Morrison,
the Second Circuit held that to satisfy Morrison’s second prong—that a domestic
securities transaction exists—“a plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that
irrevocable liability was incurred or title was transferred within the United
States.”192 Irrevocable liability relies on contract formation and occurs at the
point when the parties are bound to carry out the transaction.193 If irrevocable
liability occurred in the United States, then the transaction is considered
domestic.194 Potentially relevant facts for the Irrevocable Liability test include

186 See Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 215–16 (“[I]n the case of securities not listed on domestic exchanges, a
domestic transaction is necessary but not necessarily sufficient to make § 10(b) applicable. . . . [T]he claims in
this case are so predominantly foreign as to be impermissibly extraterritorial.”).
187 See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2012).
188 See Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 216 (“[W]e conclude that, while a domestic transaction or listing is
necessary to state a claim under § 10(b), a finding that these transactions were domestic would not suffice to
compel the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ invocation of § 10(b) was appropriately domestic.”).
189 See id. at 215–16.
190 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 260 (2010) (quoting Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
191 See Ficeto, 677 F.3d at 62 (“This case requires us to determine whether foreign funds’ purchases and
sales of securities issued by U.S. companies brokered through a U.S. broker-dealer constitute ‘domestic
transactions’ pursuant to Morrison . . . .”).
192 Id. at 68.
193 Id.
194 Id.
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those “concerning the formation of the contracts, the placement of purchase
orders, the passing of title, [and] the exchange of money.”195
In Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, where the Second
Circuit developed this doctrine, the court began its analysis by noting that
Morrison gave little guidance as to under what circumstances the purchase or
sale of a security that is not listed on a domestic exchange should be considered
a domestic transaction.196 As a result, the court looked to the text of the
Securities Exchange Act for direction in its inquiry.197 In the Securities
Exchange Act’s text, the definitions of the terms “purchase,” “buy,” “sale,” and
“sell” “suggest that ‘purchase’ and ‘sale’ take place when the parties become
bound to effectuate the transaction.”198 This point, coupled with Morrison’s
focus on the purchases and sales of securities, led the court to conclude that the
point at which parties become irrevocably bound to carry out the contract can be
used to determine the location of a securities purchase or sale.199 Thus, the

195 Id. at 70. The court explained its Irrevocable Liability test while dismissing other proposed tests. See id.
at 69–70. The other tests proposed inquiries into the identity of the parties, the type of security at issue, or
whether each individual defendant engaged in conduct within the United States, which the court denied adopting.
Id. at 69.
196 Id. at 67. In Ficeto, nine Cayman Island hedge funds fell victim to a “pump-and-dump” scheme. Id. at
62–63. The hedge funds engaged an investment management company to manage its funds, and, allegedly, the
investment management company caused the hedge fund to lose over $195 million through a series of fraudulent
securities transactions. Id. at 62–64. The investment management company, through its power of attorney to
invest on the hedge funds’ behalf, caused the funds to purchase billions of shares of penny stocks directly from
U.S. issuers. Id. at 63.
197 Id. at 67. At the time of each of the initial purchases, the officers of the investment management company
and the related defendants either already owned “substantial amounts of shares . . . or . . . received shares . . .
from the U.S. Penny Stock Companies . . . in exchange for causing the [hedge] Funds to purchase shares from
those Companies.” Id. at 63.
198 Id. at 67. Over the course of three years, the investment fund continued to arrange the financing of these
transactions with the penny stock companies to further the scheme. Id. at 63. Throughout the arrangement, the
investment management company “artificially inflated the prices of [the penny] stocks by trading and re-trading
[them] . . . each time trading the stock at a higher price to create the illusion of trading volume.” Id. At one point,
the investment company inflated the price of one of the penny stocks by causing one of the funds to trade its
shares at “6000 times [the shares’] valuation just six months earlier.” Id. at 63–64. Eventually, once the penny
stocks hit a specific price, the officers of the investment management company and related defendants caused
the hedge funds to purchase their fraudulently obtained shares from them. Id. at 64. They reaped a significant
profit, and the hedge funds faced a drastic loss from the transactions. Id. at 63–64.
199 See id. at 68. The court added that this may not be “the only way to locate a securities transaction” and
that the location can also be determined by where title is transferred. Id. Interestingly, the court also noted that
the SEC brought a proceeding for the same case and successfully argued Section 10(b) applied under the first
prong of the Transactional test “because the case involve[d] securities traded on the [domestic] over-the-counter
securities market.” Id. at 66 n.3. However, the court did not offer an opinion on the issue since the question was
not before the court. Id.
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Second Circuit created a bright-line Irrevocable Liability test to interpret
Morrison’s bright-line Transactional test.200
2. The So Predominantly Foreign Test
Soon after Ficeto, these bright-line tests faced a case that did not allow for
such seamless application.201 Considering the complexities and developing
variations of securities, this was bound to happen.202 In response, the Second
Circuit made nearly a complete turnaround from bright-line rules and
implemented a careful textual analysis of Morrison to support a more flexible
test.203
In 2014, the Second Circuit incorporated the So Predominantly Foreign test
into the analysis of Section 10(b)’s reach. In Parkcentral Global Hub Ltd. v.
Porsche Automobile Holdings SE, over thirty international hedge funds
employed securities-based swap agreements that referenced the stock of
Volkswagen, a German company traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. 204
Porsche, another German company, made public statements, primarily in
Germany, that it did not have any intentions to take over Volkswagen.205
However, over the next two years, Porsche secretly made a series of
manipulative and complex securities transactions to acquire nearly enough
shares for a controlling interest in Volkswagen.206 When Porsche’s secret plan
200 See id. at 67. Ultimately, the court concluded that the complaint failed to adequately allege the existence
of domestic securities transactions because it did not put forth facts that indicated where the securities
transactions occurred. Id. at 69–70. However, the court gave leave to amend the complaint because it was
originally written before Morrison and geared “to satisfy the conduct and effects test” instead of the
Transactional test. Id. at 71. The court suggested the hedge funds potentially could satisfy the Transactional test
because in oral arguments they claimed they possessed transactional documents that showed the transactions
occurred in the United States. See id.
201 See Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 214 (2d Cir. 2014)
(questioning whether “a domestic transaction in a security (or a transaction in a domestically listed security)” is
a sufficient or only a necessary element to invoke Section 10(b)).
202 See id. at 217 (“In a world of easy and rapid transnational communication and financial innovation,
transactions in novel financial instruments—which market participants can freely invent to serve the market’s
needs of the moment—can come in innumerable forms of which we are unaware and which we cannot possibly
foresee.”).
203 See id. (“Neither do we see anything in Morrison that requires us to adopt a ‘bright-line’ test of
extraterritoriality when deciding every § 10(b) case.”).
204 See id. at 201, 207. “A securities-based swap agreement is a private contract between two parties in
which they ‘agree to exchange cash flows that depend on the price of a reference security, here VW shares.’” Id.
at 205. “[S]ecurities-based swap agreements do not involve the actual ownership, purchase, or sale of the
reference security . . . .” Id. at 206. The international hedge funds consummated these transactions essentially as
a “bet that [Volkswagen] stock would decline in value.” Id. at 201.
205 Id. at 201–02.
206 Id. at 202–03.
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was revealed, Volkswagen’s stock price quickly skyrocketed, giving Porsche
huge capital gains and the parties to the swap agreements massive losses. 207
Eventually, it was discovered that Porsche’s original public statements regarding
its intentions not to acquire Volkswagen were fraudulent, and the American
parties to the swap agreements brought suit for violations of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.208
Unlike in Morrison, where the most significant facts all pointed in the same
direction against classifying the transaction as domestic, Parkcentral faced
conflicting facts.209 In Morrison, the securities transactions were conducted
extraterritorially among foreign parties and involved “misconduct in connection
with securities traded on foreign exchanges.”210 However, in Parkcentral, while
the derivative’s underlying stock was traded on a foreign exchange and the
fraudulent public statements were made in a foreign country, the derivative was
privately exchanged in the United States.211
To reconcile its case with Morrison and Ficeto, the court prefaced its
analysis by stating the Supreme Court’s principles that it does not lay down
broad rules to govern all conceivable future questions and makes decisions based
on the cases in front of it.212 Morrison and Ficeto were cases involving
transactions of conventional securities as opposed to derivative securities. 213
This distinction was the underlying premise to the court’s ultimate question—
whether the existence of a domestic transaction under Morrison is sufficient to
warrant the applicability of Section 10(b) or only a necessary element in
establishing Section 10(b)’s appropriate reach in a case.214

207 See id. at 205. In 2008, Porsche’s secret plan was revealed because of the global financial crisis. See id.
at 204. The global financial crisis put Porsche’s financial health in jeopardy and compelled it to make public
statements revealing its interest in Volkswagen. See id. The parties that bet the stock price would fall lost a total
of $38.1 billion. See id. at 205.
208 See id. at 201, 203 & n.2.
209 See id. at 221 n.1 (Leval, J., concurring).
210 Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 250–51 (2010)).
211
See id. at 205, 207 (majority opinion); id. at 218 (Leval, J., concurring).
212 See id. at 214 (majority opinion) (“One of the principal ‘distinction[s] between courts and legislatures
[is that] the former usually act retrospectively, settling disputes between persons, [while] the latter usually act
prospectively, setting the general rules for future conduct.’” (quoting Simmons v. Lockhart, 931 F.2d 1226 1230
(8th Cir. 1991))).
213 Id. A conventional security is a normal security like the stock of a company, while a derivative security
is a “type of financial contract whose value is dependent on an underlying asset, group of assets, or benchmark.”
Jason Fernando, Derivative, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/derivative.asp (July 15,
2022).
214 See Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 214.
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Similar to Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Morrison,215 the court pointed
out that absurd results may occur if a domestic transaction under the Irrevocable
Liability test is sufficient to warrant Section 10(b)’s applicability. 216 If a
domestic transaction was sufficient, then Section 10(b) could potentially apply
to allegedly fraudulent conduct that occurs anywhere, both domestic and
abroad.217 Parkcentral is a perfect example. The parties to the securities-based
swap agreement had no actual ownership interest in the underlying German
stock, but the swap agreement allegedly occurred in the United States—giving
rise to a domestic transaction.218 Porsche’s fraudulent conduct would subject it
to Section 10(b) liability even though Porsche was not a party to the swap
agreement, its fraudulent conduct occurred in Germany, and the underlying
German stock was only listed on a foreign exchange.219 This private exchange
between two parties in America—that only referenced the value of the German
stock—could still pull Porsche into an American court for Section 10(b)
violations.220
Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that a domestic transaction is only a
necessary element in establishing Section 10(b)’s applicability and not a
sufficient condition.221 To support its conclusion, the court set forth two main
arguments from its textual analysis of Morrison.222 First, Morrison did not
explicitly say that the existence of a domestic transaction or listing was sufficient
to make Section 10(b) applicable, and the words chosen by Morrison are
“consistent with the description of necessary elements rather than sufficient
conditions.”223 The Court in Morrison held that Section 10(b) applies only to
domestic transactions, not that Section 10(b) applies to all domestic
transactions.224 Second, Morrison’s principal concern was to prevent conflict
between Section 10(b) and international securities laws in the absence of

215 Cf. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 285 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the absurd result that
would ensue from applying the Transactional test to his proposed hypothetical).
216 See Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 214 (“The mere fact that the plaintiffs based their suit on a domestic
transaction would make § 10(b) applicable to allegedly fraudulent conduct anywhere in the world.”).
217 Id.
218
See id. at 206–07.
219 See id. at 215–16.
220 See id.
221 Id. at 216. The court recognized that Morrison established two main rules: (1) Section 10(b) only applies
domestically because of the presumption against extraterritoriality; and (2) Section 10(b) does not apply unless
the transaction involves a security listed on a domestic exchange or there is a domestic securities transaction. Id.
at 214–15 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265, 267 (2010)).
222 See id. at 215.
223 Id. (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267).
224 See id.
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congressional intent.225 Permitting Section 10(b) to apply to a U.S. transaction
consisting of wholly foreign activity, and clearly subject to foreign regulation,
would create such a conflict and would undermine Morrison’s conclusion that
Section 10(b) does not have extraterritorial application.226
Taking these considerations into account, the court expanded the domestic
transaction analysis past the application of the Ficeto Irrevocable Liability
test.227 The court decided it need not apply its Irrevocable Liability test to
determine if there was a domestic transaction in this case because the necessary
element would be outweighed by the other relevant facts anyway. 228 Instead of
making a domestic transaction dispositive, the court’s new So Predominantly
Foreign test used it only as a factor in the analysis.229
The So Predominantly Foreign test is a flexible multifactored test that
considers the relevant facts of each case in determining whether the conduct was
so predominantly foreign that to permit Section 10(b)’s application would
violate the presumption against extraterritoriality.230 The purpose of the So
Predominantly Foreign test “is to ensure, in transnational circumstances, that
[Section] 10(b) not be given extraterritorial application, while preserving the
domestic coverage that Congress intended.”231 Applying the test, the court
concluded the relevant actions in this case of first impression were “so
predominantly German” that to permit Section 10(b)’s application would violate
the presumption against extraterritoriality.232
In Judge Leval’s concurrence, he expanded on the So Predominantly Foreign
test’s justification in light of Morrison.233 Judge Leval acknowledged that the
language in Morrison may be read on its face to require a bright-line rule as
opposed to a multi-factor test.234 He noted that Morrison had two main criticisms
of the multi-factored Conduct and Effects test that the lower courts used pre-

225

See id.
Id. at 215–16 (“That is a result Morrison plainly did not contemplate and that the Court’s reasoning does
not, we think, permit.”).
227
See id. at 216.
228 See id.
229 See id. at 217 (“We believe courts must carefully make their way with careful attention to the facts of
each case and to combinations of facts that have proved determinative in prior cases, so as eventually to develop
a reasonable and consistent governing body of law on this elusive question.”).
230 See id. at 218 (Leval, J., concurring).
231 See id. at 219.
232 Id. at 216–17 (majority opinion).
233 See id. at 220–21 (Leval, J., concurring).
234 See id. at 218.
226
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Morrison.235 The main criticisms were that the test “‘disregard[ed]’ the
presumption against extraterritoriality” and unpredictably applied Section 10(b)
in circumstances that conflicted with foreign securities law. 236 However,
because these criticisms were mainly focused on the application of the Conduct
and Effects test, they should not generally be interpreted as a condemnation of
multi-factor tests in this area.237 Further, Judge Leval added that using a multifactor test is consistent with modern jurisprudence and an inflexible bright-line
rule was insufficient to adapt to a developing securities market.238
The Second Circuit reaffirmed its So Predominantly Foreign test in January
2021.239 The court added that the So Predominantly Foreign test uses Section
10(b)’s “focus on the transaction [of the securities,] rather than the surrounding
circumstances, . . . [to] flexibly consider[] whether a claim—in view of the
security and the transaction as structured—is still predominantly foreign.”240
The key factors to the analysis are the contacts in connection with the transaction
of the securities.241 With the application of this “gloss on Morrison’s rule,” a
domestic transaction alone is not sufficient to satisfy Section 10(b)’s geographic
requirements and only “operates as a threshold requirement.” 242

235

Id. at 218–19.
Id.
237 See id. at 219.
238 See id. at 220–21.
239 Cavello Bay Reinsurance Ltd. v. Shubin Stein, 986 F.3d 161, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2021). In the Second
Circuit’s brief analysis of the irrevocable liability issue, the court recognized that “the transaction arguably took
place in the United States” since the agreement was signed in New York. Id. at 165. But, on the other hand, the
agreement was also signed in Bermuda. Id. at 164. The court explained that this demonstrated “the place of
transaction is difficult to locate, and impossible to do without making state [contract] law.” Id. at 165.
240 Id. at 166–67.
241 See id. at 167. In its analysis, the court classified the facts of the case into three categories. See id. In
order of importance, the three categories were the following: (1) facts that triggered some U.S. interest or other
interest Section 10(b) was meant to protect; (2) “acts evincing contract formation;” and (3) those facts that would
have been relevant to the Conduct and Effects test. See id. First, the court concluded that providing a domestic
forum, in this case, would not enhance confidence in the U.S. securities market or protect U.S. investors. Id. The
main link to the United States was a provision in the subscription agreement requiring the Bermudan corporation
to register the shares with the SEC in the event it wanted to resell the shares. Id. Since the Bermudan corporation
had not exercised this provision, it did not trigger any U.S. interest. See id. Second, the court appeared to
disregard the allegations that the parties’ communications executing the agreement occurred between New York
and Bermuda. See id. at 167–68. While these considerations were relevant to where irrevocable liability
occurred, they did not resolve the question as to whether the claims were predominantly foreign. See id. Third,
the court determined that the Bermudian holding company’s misstatement that was sent from New York, plan
to use the invested funds to invest in U.S. insurance services, and the presence of its CEO, directors, and principal
place of business in New York did not matter in the present inquiry. See id. at 167 (“The contacts that matter are
those that relate to the purchase and sale of securities.”). Thus, the court concluded the Bermudian corporation
failed to plead a domestic application of Section 10(b). Id. at 168.
242 See id. at 165–66.
236
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The So Predominantly Foreign test correctly prioritizes Morrison’s
international comity concerns, but falls back to the principal criticisms that
Morrison had about the Conduct and Effects test.243 Like the Conduct and
Effects test, the So Predominantly Foreign test lacks dispositive factors that can
be applied to future cases.244 Moreover, when introducing the So Predominantly
Foreign test, the Second Circuit conceded it did not “purport to proffer a test that
will reliably determine when a particular invocation of § 10(b) will be deemed
appropriately domestic or impermissibly extraterritorial.”245
B. The Other Side of the Circuit Split
The other circuit courts strongly oppose the Second Circuit’s additional
requirement to Section 10(b)’s applicability and claim it is in direct
contravention to Morrison.246 But while the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits
adopt the Second Circuit’s Irrevocable Liability test, 247 their analyses differ in
significant respects. The First Circuit rejected the Second Circuit’s So
Predominantly Foreign test, but used the same language from Morrison that the
Second Circuit relied on to justify its new test.248 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
So Predominantly Foreign test and implemented its own necessary-sufficiency
argument to shift the Second Circuit’s international comity concerns to a
different part of the Section 10(b) analysis.249 The Third Circuit failed to address
243 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 258–59 (2010) (“There is no more damning
indictment of the ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ tests than the Second Circuit’s own declaration that ‘the presence or
absence of any single factor which was considered significant in other cases . . . is not necessarily dispositive in
future cases.’” (quoting IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980))). The Supreme Court also agreed
with commentators’ criticisms of the Conduct and Effects test’s “unpredictable and inconsistent application of
§ 10(b) to transnational cases.” Id. at 260–61.
244 Cf. Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 217 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The
conclusion we have reached on these facts cannot, of course, be perfunctorily applied to other cases based on
the perceived similarity of a few facts.”).
245 Id. (emphasis added).
246 See Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp., 896 F.3d 933, 950 (9th Cir. 2018); SEC v. Morrone, 997 F.3d 52, 60 (1st
Cir. 2021).
247 See Morrone, 997 F.3d at 60 (“We agree with the reasoning of the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits
and hold that a transaction is domestic under Morrison if irrevocable liability occurs in the United States.”);
United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 137 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We now hold that irrevocable liability establishes
the location of a securities transaction.”); Stoyas, 896 F.3d at 949 (“We are persuaded by the Second and Third
Circuits’ analysis and therefore adopt the irrevocable liability test . . . .”).
248 Compare Morrone, 997 F.3d at 60 (quoting Morrison’s language of “only transactions in securities” to
determine that a domestic transaction is sufficient to apply the federal securities laws), with Parkcentral, 763
F.3d at 215 (concluding the “only transactions in securities” language is consistent with the description of
necessary elements).
249 See Stoyas, 896 F.3d at 950–51 (“Morrison delineates the transactions to which the Exchange Act can
theoretically apply without being impermissibly extraterritorial, but while applicability is necessary, it is not
sufficient to state an Exchange Act claim.”).
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the Second Circuit’s So Predominantly Foreign test altogether.250 Notably, even
the same side of the split lacks uniformity.
1. The Third Circuit—United States v. Georgiou
In 2015, the Third Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s Irrevocable Liability
test in Georgiou, but failed to address the Parkcentral decision, despite the
Second Circuit adjudicating Parkcentral five months prior.251 In its case of first
impression, the Third Circuit determined whether transactions involving
securities “issued by U.S. companies through U.S. market makers acting as
intermediaries for foreign entities” satisfy Morrison’s second prong.252
In Georgiou, Georgiou engaged in a stock fraud scheme that manipulated the
markets of four U.S. stocks.253 The stocks were listed only on over-the-counter
markets.254 Throughout the “‘pump and dump’ scheme,” Georgiou used
“various alias accounts, nominees, and offshore brokerage accounts” in Canada,
the Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos to conceal his ownership of the four stocks
and artificially inflate the stocks’ prices.255 To inflate the prices, he traded the
shares between the offshore brokerage accounts to create the illusion of an active
market for the stocks.256 Once the prices were inflated, he was “able to sell their
shares at inflated prices” to make a profit.257
Unfortunately for Georgiou, one of his co-conspirators cooperated with an
FBI sting operation.258 Georgiou was exposed, and the United States instituted
250

See Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 135–37.
See Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 198, 212; Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 125, 135–37.
252 Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 130. A market maker is “an intermediary in a stock exchange who controls buy
and sell orders (as by purchase and resale) for a particular stock or group of stocks.” Market Maker, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/market%20maker (last visited Nov. 11, 2021).
253 Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 130.
254 See id. at 134 & n.10.
255 Id. at 130–31, 147.
256 Id. at 130–31.
257 See id. at 131. To solicit investments for one of the stocks, Georgiou sent an email to seven million
potential buyers. Id. at 147. Georgiou also used the worthless shares as collateral for margin-eligible accounts
with several of the offshore brokerage firms. Id. at 131. A margin account is “a client’s account with a brokerage
firm through which the client may buy securities on the firm’s credit.” Margin Account, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/margin%20account (last visited Nov. 11, 2021). The margin-eligible
accounts allowed Georgiou to take out loans from the offshore brokerage firms to purchase other securities,
enabling him to make these purchases without the use of his own money. See Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 132.
Unbeknownst to the offshore brokerage firms, Georgiou in essence used the offshore brokerage firms’ own
money to manipulate the stocks’ prices that were used as collateral, made a profit off the inflated prices, and
then never repaid the loans. See id. As a result of Georgiou’s scheme, one of the offshore brokerage firms lost
about $25 million and was liquidated, while another lost about $4 million. Id. at 131 n.3, 132.
258 Id. at 131.
251
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a proceeding against Georgiou for violation of, among other things, Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.259 However, Georgiou challenged Section 10(b)’s
applicability to his conduct under Morrison as impermissibly extraterritorial.260
The Third Circuit refuted the challenge and concluded Georgiou’s conduct fell
within the reach of Section 10(b) under the second prong of Morrison’s
Transactional test.261
First, because the stocks were listed only on over-the-counter markets, the
Third Circuit determined the four stocks were not listed on a national securities
exchange under Morrison’s first prong.262 The court reasoned over-the-counter
markets in the United States did not constitute a national securities exchange
because the Securities Exchange Act references national securities exchanges
and over-the-counter markets separately.263 The SEC also specifically lists the
registered U.S. national securities exchanges on its website and the over-thecounter markets, in this case, were not included in that list.264 Therefore, the four
stocks were not listed on a national securities exchange under Morrison’s first
prong.265
Second, the court established that the location of a transaction determines
whether a domestic transaction exists under Morrison’s second prong, thus
adopting the Second Circuit’s Irrevocable Liability test.266 To determine the
location of the transaction, the court concluded that it must look to where the
commitment to perform the contemplated agreement took place.267 In applying
the Irrevocable Liability test to the case before it, the court held that “at least one
of the fraudulent transactions in each of the [four stocks] was bought and sold

259

Id. at 130, 133.
See id. at 132–33.
261 See id. at 137.
262 See id. at 134–35.
263 See id.
264 Id. at 134. The SEC provides a list of national securities exchanges on its website. National Securities
Exchanges,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/divisionsmarketregmrexchangesshtml.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2022).
265
See Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 135. The Third Circuit distinguished this case from the “foreign cubed action”
in Morrison. Id. A “foreign cubed action” is an action brought by foreign plaintiffs in a U.S. court against a
foreign issuer for violations of U.S. securities laws regarding securities transactions that occurred in foreign
countries. Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 283 n.11 (2010)). In contrast to Morrison,
this case involved securities transactions of stocks of U.S. companies listed on U.S. over-the-counter markets
that were executed by U.S. market makers. Id.
266 See id. at 135, 137. The court noted that relevant facts in the analysis include the “formation of the
contracts, the placement of purchase orders, the passing of title, or the exchange of money.” Id. at 136 (quoting
Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 2012)).
267 See id.
260

470

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:437

through U.S.-based market makers.”268 The U.S. market makers bought the
stock from Georgiou while in the United States and then sold the stocks to buyers
in the United States.269 The parties to the transactions became irrevocably bound
to the transactions in the United States, and thus the securities transactions
occurred here.270 Because the securities transactions occurred in the United
States, the transactions were domestic, and Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were
applicable to Georgiou’s conduct under Morrison.271
2. The Ninth Circuit—Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp.
Three years later, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s Irrevocable
Liability test and rejected its So Predominantly Foreign test.272 The Ninth Circuit
refuted the Second Circuit’s position in Parkcentral that “a domestic transaction
is necessary but not sufficient under Morrison” by arguing that it was the
location of the transaction that mattered, and not whether a foreign entity was a
party to the transaction.273 According to the court, Parkcentral carved out
predominantly foreign claims from Section 10(b)’s coverage on the basis of
speculation of congressional intent and focused heavily on the foreign location
of the deceptive conduct, both bases that Morrison explicitly rejected.274
268

Id.
Id. at 136.
270 See id. at 136–37.
271 Id.
272 Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp., 896 F.3d 933, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2018). The court noted that the Irrevocable
Liability test “hew[ed] to Section 10(b)’s focus on transactions and Morrison’s instruction that purchases and
sales constitute transactions.” Id. at 949. However, the court conceded that application of the Irrevocable
Liability test may result in Section 10(b)’s application to extraterritorial conduct. See id. at 950.
273 Id. at 949. In its case of first impression, the Ninth Circuit addressed “the question of the nature of
[American depositary receipts] and their transactions, and whether [a Japanese corporation’s] [American
depositary receipts] [were] covered by the [Securities] Exchange Act through either registry on a national
exchange, or through domestic sales and purchases.” Id. at 937. In Stoyas, American investors purchased
unsponsored American depositary receipts for stock of Toshiba, a publicly traded Japanese corporation. Id. at
938, 941. Toshiba’s shares were traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the American depositary receipts
were traded on an over-the-counter market listed with the SEC. Id. at 937, 939–40. American depositary receipts
are unsponsored when their depositary institution files them with the SEC without the formal participation of
the underlying shares’ company. See id. at 941. Additionally, the unsponsored American depositary receipts
could be filed without the underlying shares’ company’s acquiescence. Id. Thus, when the unsponsored
American depositary receipts are purchased by investors, the transaction would essentially be a two-party
contract between the investor and the depositary institution, and not the company of the underlying shares. Id.
In contrast, sponsored American depositary receipts are sponsored when the depositary institution and the
company of the underlying shares jointly file the American depositary receipts with the SEC. Id. at 941 n.8.
Purchases of sponsored American depositary receipts are essentially three-party contracts. Id.
274 See id. at 950. After the American investors purchased the American depositary receipts, investigations
directed by the Japanese government revealed that Toshiba deliberately implemented fraudulent accounting
practices to inflate Toshiba’s profit statements. Id. at 937 & n.1. Toshiba later admitted to these fraudulent
accounting practices and Toshiba’s stock price declined by more than 40%, causing a $7.6 billion loss in market
269
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In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit employed its own necessary-sufficient
conditions argument.275 While “Morrison delineates the transactions to which
the Exchange Act can theoretically apply without being impermissibly
extraterritorial,” applicability is only a necessary condition to state a Securities
Exchange Act claim.276 Essentially, Section 10(b)’s capability to reach
challenged conduct is not equivalent to satisfying the several requirements for a
violation of Section 10(b).277
Significantly, the court emphasized Section 10(b)’s “in connection with”
element.278 There must be “a connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the purchase or sale of a security.”279 “[F]or fraud to be ‘in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security,’ it must ‘touch’ the sale—
i.e., it must be done to induce the purchase at issue.”280 “In connection with”
should be construed “flexibly to effectuate [the Exchange Act’s] remedial
purposes” as opposed to technically and restrictively.281
The Ninth Circuit’s description of the “in connection with” requirement
suggests that the concerns the Second Circuit has about excessive foreign
elements will be dealt with later, procedurally, when the conduct is evaluated
under Section 10(b)’s elements.282 If the conduct really is so “predominantly
capitalization. Id. American investors lost hundreds of millions of dollars and brought a class action against
Toshiba for violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. at 937.
275 See id. at 950–51 (“Morrison delineates the transactions to which the Exchange Act can theoretically
apply without being impermissibly extraterritorial, but while applicability is necessary, it is not sufficient to state
an Exchange Act claim.”). In an earlier part of the analysis where the court addressed Morrison’s first prong,
the Ninth Circuit pointed out that when the Morrison court articulated the rule, it repeatedly described the
category as “securities listed on domestic exchanges” rather than securities listed on national exchanges. See id.
at 945 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010)). According to the Ninth Circuit,
a national securities exchange is a subset of domestic exchange, and twenty-one national securities exchanges
are registered with the SEC. Id. The court suggested that Morrison’s Transactional test was intended to
encompass more than the subset of national securities exchanges and include securities listed on a domestic
exchange. See id. However, the court refrained from answering that question because it determined that the overthe-counter market that the Toshiba American depositary receipts were traded on did not constitute an
“exchange” pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act’s definition. Id. The over-the-counter market that the
American depositary receipts were traded on was “registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as
a ‘broker-dealer’ alternative trading system.” Id. at 946 (citations omitted). An alternative trading system is
separately regulated by the SEC and is specifically exempt from the Exchange Act’s definition of “exchange.”
See id. (citations omitted).
276 Id. at 950–51.
277 See id.
278 Id. at 951 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).
279 Id. (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)).
280 Id. (citations omitted).
281 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377, 393 (2014)).
282 See id. at 950–51 (arguing that Morrison’s “animating comity concerns” are directly relevant to whether
a Securities Exchange Act claim has been sufficiently alleged regarding the “in connection with” requirement).
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foreign,” then that effectively should preclude Section 10(b)’s “in connection
with” requirement from being satisfied.283 Thus, even if the Irrevocable Liability
test grants Section 10(b)’s “theoretical application,” the foreign conduct may
preclude a sufficient causal link from being established to satisfy the “in
connection with” requirement.284
3. The First Circuit—SEC v. Morrone
On May 10, 2021, the First Circuit adopted the Irrevocable Liability test and
rejected the Second Circuit’s So Predominantly Foreign test.285 The transactions
in Morrone involved a Delaware corporation with U.S. corporate officers,
foreign investors, and its principal place of business in Massachusetts. 286 The
Delaware corporation’s stock was not registered with the SEC or listed on either
a domestic or foreign exchange. 287
As a response to the anthrax scare after the September 11 terrorist attacks,
the Delaware corporation was created to manufacture a machine that was
“capable of decontaminating letters of biological pathogens.”288 Unfortunately
for investors, the Delaware corporation “never earned a profit and lost at least
$2 million each year . . . over a six-year period.”289 During that period, the
Delaware corporation only sold about ten of the machines for a total of
$430,000, but managed to “raise[] almost $25 million from stock sales to private
investors.”290
The officers of the Delaware corporation first attempted to solicit U.S.
investors for the company.291 However, multiple state investigations curbed the
officers’ efforts because the securities were not registered with the respective

283

See id.
See id. (“The court should consider whether the plaintiff has shown some causal connection between the
fraud and the securities transaction in question.”). After applying the Irrevocable Liability test to the facts of the
case, the court determined the complaint did not sufficiently allege that irrevocable liability took place in the
United States. See id. at 949. The court noted, however, that “an amended complaint could almost certainly
allege sufficient facts to establish . . . a domestic transaction” because the depositary institutions exchanging the
Toshiba American depositary receipts operated in America and, therefore, America likely was where the
purchases occurred. Id.
285 SEC v. Morrone, 997 F.3d 52, 60 (1st Cir. 2021). In its case of first impression, the First Circuit applied
Morrison to determine whether a transaction was domestic. Id. at 59.
286 Id. at 54–55.
287 Id. at 55, 59, 61.
288 Id. at 55.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 See id. at 55–56.
284

2022]

A WOLF HUNT OFF WALL STREET

473

states.292 Consequently, the officers directed their efforts abroad.293 The
corporate officers engaged a foreign brokerage firm that used “boiler room
tactics” to solicit investors in Europe.294 The foreign brokerage firm charged an
“exorbitantly high [fee] . . . that no legitimate, professional consulting group
would charge.”295 Outside counsel for the Delaware corporation advised the
officers not to enter into an agreement with this foreign brokerage firm and, if
they did, that the agreement would constitute an “absolutely critical disclosure
that would need to be made to any potential investor.”296
The officers ignored outside counsel and proceeded with the agreement with
the foreign brokerage firm.297 The officers prepared, among other documents,
call scripts for soliciting investors and a stock subscription agreement. 298 None
of the documents for the potential investors mentioned the foreign brokerage
firm’s fee.299 In addition to that fee, the foreign investment funds were further
reduced by a large commission fee that the officers of the Delaware corporation
paid themselves, leaving the Delaware corporation with less than 25% of the
investors’ funds.300 From 2008 to 2010, the officers employed similar schemes
until the SEC filed a complaint for multiple violations of the federal securities
acts, including Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.301 The officers argued that Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could not reach their conduct because it constituted
“foreign transactions involving foreign investors solicited by foreign brokerage
firms.”302 The court disagreed and evaluated the case under Morrison’s second
prong, given that the Delaware corporation’s stock was not listed on a domestic
exchange.303

292

See id. at 56.
See id.
294 Id. at 56, 58. “A boiler room is a scheme in which salespeople apply high-pressure sales tactics to
persuade investors to purchase securities, including speculative and fraudulent securities.” James Chen, Boiler
Room, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/boilerroom.asp (Apr. 18, 2022).
295 Morrone, 997 F.3d at 56 (internal quotations omitted). The foreign brokerage firm received 75% of any
investor funds that it raised for the Delaware corporation. Id.
296 Id. There was “ample evidence” that the officers knew they had to make disclosures about the foreign
brokerage firm’s fee and knew about the “boiler-room tactics” but failed to take any corrective action. Id. at 62.
297
See id. at 57.
298 See id.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 See id. at 57–58.
302 Id. at 59.
303 Id. In the First Circuit’s analysis, it acknowledged Morrison’s determination that “[Section] 10(b)’s
focus is on transactions” because its purpose is to regulate securities transactions and “protect ‘parties or
prospective parties to those transactions.’” Id. at 60 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247,
267 (2010)).
293
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The First Circuit adopted the Irrevocable Liability test to determine whether
a domestic transaction existed under Morrison’s second prong.304 In applying
the Irrevocable Liability test to this case, the court determined that irrevocable
liability was incurred in the United States because the stock subscription
agreements were executed in Boston and the shares were issued to the investors
from Boston.305 The stock subscription agreements stated that the Delaware
corporation had “no obligation” until copies of the executed and delivered
subscription agreements were delivered to the purchaser.306 As a result, the
Delaware corporation “became irrevocably liable to deliver the shares in
Boston,” and, because a domestic transaction existed, Section 10(b) applied to
the fraudulent conduct.307
Then, like the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit concluded that a domestic
transaction is sufficient to warrant Section 10(b) applicability and rejected
Parkcentral for its inconsistency with Morrison.308 To support its analysis, the
First Circuit cited Morrison’s language: “[i]t is in our view only transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other
securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”309 From this language, the First Circuit
claimed that the Supreme Court “explicitly said that, if a transaction is domestic,
§ 10(b) applies.”310 However, the validity of this claim is questionable because
the First Circuit failed to address the Second Circuit’s principal argument that
“only” is an indicator of a necessary condition. 311 Indeed, the First Circuit
committed a logical fallacy in its argument since it confused a necessary
condition with a sufficient condition.
Despite rejecting the So Predominantly Foreign test, the First Circuit
concluded that the claims presented in this case were not “so predominantly

304 See id. The court approved of the other circuits’ reasoning that because the point at which parties become
irrevocably bound can be used to determine the timing of a securities transaction, it can also be used to determine
the locus of a securities transaction. Id. at 59–60 (“We agree with the reasoning of the Second, Third, and Ninth
Circuits . . . .”).
305 Id. at 60. “It is undisputed that these subscription agreements were executed . . . in Boston,” and that the
shares were issued to the investors from Boston. Id.
306
Id.
307 See id.
308 See id. (“Like the Ninth Circuit, we reject Parkcentral as inconsistent with Morrison.”).
309 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010)).
310 Id.
311 Compare id. (quoting Morrison’s language of “only transactions in securities” to determine that a
domestic transaction is sufficient to apply the federal securities laws (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267)), with
Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 215 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The [‘only
transactions in securities’] language the Court used was consistent with the description of necessary elements
rather than sufficient conditions.” (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267)).
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foreign as to be impermissibly extraterritorial” and distinguished Parkcentral.312
In applying the So Predominantly Foreign test, the court determined that because
the officers and the Delaware corporation were based in the United States, the
officers “conducted nearly all of their activities in furtherance of the fraud from
the U.S.[,]” and the stock “was not traded on a foreign exchange[,]” there were
sufficient U.S. connections to “render[] the fraud domestic.”313 The court argued
this case contrasted with Parkcentral, which “involved significantly more
foreign conduct” and securities in a foreign company listed on a foreign
exchange.314
In their adoption of the Irrevocable Liability test, the First, Third, and Ninth
Circuits stand together on one side of the split, despite the discord in their
analyses.315 On the other side of the split, the Second Circuit deviates,
considering a domestic transaction as only a threshold requirement to Section
10(b) applicability, and applying its So Predominantly Foreign test.316 And,
soon, unless the Supreme Court or Congress intervenes, the issue will be
presented to the other seven circuit courts, which will further divide the split.
Compounding this split, the Tenth Circuit took the first steps toward starting
another split arising from the Morrison decision. The resolution of these issues
requires unanimous implementation of a flexible framework that properly
incorporates Morrison’s international comity concerns and can adapt to a rapidly
developing securities market.
V. IPO OF THE SPECTRUM TEST
This Comment proposes a new framework implementing a Spectrum test for
determining Section 10(b) applicability and evaluating domestic transactions
under Morrison. Currently, the analysis for determining Section 10(b)
applicability is as follows.
First, a court implements the Morrison two-step analysis to the federal
statute.317 Under the Morrison two-step analysis, a court determines (1) whether
there is affirmative and unmistakable congressional intent that the federal statute
applies extraterritorially to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality;
and (2) if the federal statute does not overcome the presumption against
312
313
314
315
316
317

Morrone, 997 F.3d at 61 (quoting Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 216).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Cavello Bay Reinsurance Ltd. v. Shubin Stein, 986 F.3d 161, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2021).
See SEC v. Scoville, 913 F.3d 1204, 1215 (10th Cir. 2019).
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extraterritoriality, then the federal statute only applies domestically, and a court
must determine whether the challenged conduct is domestic.318 If the challenged
conduct is found to be domestic, then it falls within the federal statute’s
purview.319 Morrison established that Section 10(b) lacks the congressional
intent to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality and only applies
domestically.320 Thus, Section 10(b) is evaluated under the second step of the
two-step analysis.321
Second, a court then uses the Morrison two-prong Transactional test to
determine whether challenged conduct is domestic and invokes Section 10(b)
applicability.322 Under the Transactional test, Section 10(b) only applies to
transactions in securities listed on a domestic exchange and purchases and sales
in securities made in the United States.323 Generally, under the first prong,
domestic exchanges have been interpreted to include the national securities
exchanges listed on the SEC’s website.324 Domestic exchanges may encompass
more than the national securities exchanges listed but do not include U.S. overthe-counter markets.325 Under the second prong, a domestic transaction occurs
when the purchaser or seller incurs irrevocable liability from the transaction in
the United States.326
The third step is where the Second Circuit splits with the First, Third, and
Ninth Circuit Courts in the analysis. While the four circuit courts agree that
satisfaction of the Transactional test’s first prong is sufficient to warrant Section
10(b) applicability,327 only the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits hold that
satisfaction of the second prong is sufficient to trigger Section 10(b)
applicability.328 For these three circuit courts, if the second prong is satisfied,
318

See id.
See id.
320 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
321 See id.
322 See id. at 266–67.
323 See id. at 266.
324 See United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 134–35 (3d Cir. 2015); Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp., 896 F.3d
933, 945 & n.13 (9th Cir. 2018).
325
See Stoyas, 896 F.3d at 945.
326 See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2012).
327 See SEC v. Morrone, 997 F.3d 52, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2021); Cavello Bay Reinsurance Ltd. v. Shubin Stein,
986 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Unless a security is listed on a domestic exchange, a domestic transaction is
a necessary element of a § 10(b) claim.”); Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 134 (“Under the first prong of Morrison, Section
10(b) applies to ‘the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange.’” (quoting Morrison,
561 U.S. at 273)); Stoyas, 896 F.3d at 945.
328 See Morrone, 997 F.3d at 60 (“The existence of a domestic transaction suffices to apply the federal
securities laws under Morrison.”); Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 137 (“We now hold that irrevocable liability establishes
the location of a securities transaction.”); Stoyas, 896 F.3d at 949–50.
319
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then Section 10(b) applies to the challenged conduct.329 The Second Circuit
deviates, and treats satisfaction of the second prong as a threshold requirement
to Section 10(b)’s applicability.330 According to the Second Circuit, even if the
second prong is satisfied, Section 10(b) still may not apply to the challenged
conduct if the challenged conduct is “so predominantly foreign.”331
A. Spectrum Test Framework
This Comment offers the following framework for the analysis. First, the
Morrison two-step analysis and conclusion remain unchanged. Section 10(b)
does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality and does not apply
extraterritorially.332 Second, Morrison’s Transactional test remains equally
unchanged. Section 10(b) applies to transactions in securities listed on a
domestic exchange and to domestic transactions.
Third, differing from the Second Circuit, if either prong of the Transactional
test is satisfied, then Section 10(b) applies. Morrison determined, in its two-step
analysis, that Section 10(b) applies domestically.333 To determine whether
activity is domestic, and Section 10(b) applies, Morrison created the
Transactional test.334 Although the Court uses language indicating a necessary
condition in its test,335 the Second Circuit’s argument that satisfaction of the
Transactional test does not alone warrant that Section 10(b) applicability should
be rejected. The Second Circuit’s textual argument contradicts Morrison and
defies common logic.336 If a transaction involves a security listed on a domestic
exchange or there is a domestic transaction, then it follows that the challenged
transaction is domestic, since that is the plain label of the activity. Section 10(b)
necessarily applies to the domestic transaction because Section 10(b) applies to
domestic conduct.

329

See Morrone, 997 F.3d at 60 (“The existence of a domestic transaction suffices to apply the federal
securities laws under Morrison.”); Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 137 (“We now hold that irrevocable liability establishes
the location of a securities transaction.”); Stoyas, 896 F.3d at 949–50.
330 Cavello Bay, 986 F.3d at 166 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Morrison’s ‘domestic transaction’ rule operates as a
threshold requirement, and as such may be underinclusive.”).
331 See id. at 165–66.
332 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
333 See id. at 267.
334 See id. at 273.
335 See Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 215 (2d Cir. 2014)
(concluding the “only transactions in securities” language is consistent with the description of necessary
elements).
336 See Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp., 896 F.3d 933, 950 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he principal reason that we should
not follow the Parkcentral decision is because it is contrary to Section 10(b) and Morrison itself.”).
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Indeed, transactions in securities listed on a domestic exchange are sufficient
to warrant Section 10(b) liability. For a business to have securities listed on a
domestic exchange, there are ample requirements—under the Securities Act,
Securities Exchange Act, and regulations promulgated by the SEC—that
businesses must comply with and continually follow.337 If a business is
continually complying with these stringent U.S. requirements and benefiting to
such a high degree from U.S. investors in the U.S. stock market, no reason
suggests that the business should be exempt from complying with Section 10(b)
and the SEC’s Rule 10b-5. This level of domestic activity surely warrants
domestic regulation under Section 10(b), and foreign elements cannot render a
transaction in the listed security as extraterritorial. Therefore, a transaction of a
security listed on a domestic exchange is sufficient to warrant Section 10(b)
applicability.
The Second Circuit’s concerns about overbearing foreign elements are not
without merit and should be shifted in the analysis.338 Instead of determining
that satisfaction of the second prong of the Transactional test is not sufficient to
warrant Section 10(b) applicability, the Second Circuit’s concerns should be
considered in determining whether a domestic transaction exists under
Morrison’s second prong.
This is where this Comment’s proposal deviates from the circuit courts’
conclusions of what constitutes a domestic transaction. Morrison failed to give
adequate guidance on the inquiry as to what constitutes a domestic transaction
and left it for the lower courts to resolve.339 The circuit courts look to whether
irrevocable liability occurred in the United States to determine if a transaction is
domestic.340 These courts recognize that foreign elements are bound to influence
the analysis but still rely on this bright-line test to determine if there is a domestic
transaction.341
The more rational approach is to recognize that the ambiguity derives from
what constitutes a domestic transaction. When a transaction has both domestic

337
See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 33 (“In general, the [Securities Act of 1933] governs the issuance of
securities by the corporation itself. In contrast, the [Securities Exchange Act of 1934] provides information to
the markets for new securities and resales by requiring many corporations continually to provide detailed public
reports about their operations.”).
338 See Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 216 (“[T]he application of § 10(b) to the defendants would so obviously
implicate the incompatibility of U.S. and foreign laws that Congress could not have intended it sub silentio.”).
339 See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012).
340 E.g., id. at 68.
341 See, e.g., Stoyas, 896 F.3d at 950 (“[I]t may very well be that the Morrison test in some cases will result
in the Exchange Act’s application to claims of manipulation of share value from afar.”).
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and foreign elements, the appropriate approach must evaluate how much the
domestic elements must outweigh the foreign elements to consider the
transaction domestic. This question does not lend itself to a bright-line test.
Rather, the inquiry requires a flexible test that can handle the continuing
globalization of the securities market and the rapid development of securities.
When determining whether a domestic transaction exists, irrevocable
liability that incurred in the United States should be a threshold requirement.
Then, if irrevocable liability occurred in the United States but there are
significant foreign elements surrounding the transaction, further analysis is
required. For this further analysis, this Comment proposes the use of the
Spectrum test.
The Spectrum test is a factor balancing test that determines if the foreign
elements of a transaction overcome the domestic elements to preclude a
domestic transaction, rendering Section 10(b) inapplicable to the conduct. The
relevant factors are (1) whether significant steps occurred in the United States
that have a direct link to the fraudulent securities transaction; (2) whether the
fraudulent conduct will have significant effects on American investors and the
U.S. stock market; (3) whether the United States has a strong interest in
exercising its judicial resources for the case; (4) the probability that application
of Section 10(b) to the case will conflict with other countries’ securities laws;
and (5) the magnitude of the conflict that Section 10(b) would cause with other
countries’ securities laws.
This analysis recognizes and accounts for the Supreme Court’s concerns in
Morrison. First, the presumption against extraterritoriality is maintained.
Second, the Court’s criticism of the Conduct and Effects test’s inconsistent
application due to a lack of dispositive factors is addressed.342 Morrison
disapproved of the Conduct and Effects test, but it criticized the test’s
application, not the factors themselves. Implementing the Conduct and Effects
factors in the analysis permits the Spectrum test to build off the long line of
Section 10(b) applicability jurisprudence343 and provides lower courts with
342 Morrison criticized the Conduct and Effects test’s inconsistent application, lack of textual support,
disregard of the presumption of extraterritoriality, and its focus on discovering congressional intent for a
particular case. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 258, 260–61 (2010).
343 See generally Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[D]istrict court[s] ha[ve]
subject matter jurisdiction over [extraterritorial] violations of the Securities Exchange Act . . . when the
transactions involve stock registered and listed on a [domestic] exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of
American investors.”), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247; Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326, 1337–39 (2d Cir. 1972) (considering where the transactions took place in reaching its conclusion
that the Securities Exchange Act reaches transactions involving foreign securities when “substantial
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significant direction to continue to develop this area of securities law. The
Spectrum test allows the federal courts to progressively set the boundaries of
where domestic conduct ends and extraterritorial application begins. Third, the
Spectrum test takes into account the Supreme Court’s concerns with the
international comity of securities laws since these concerns are incorporated into
the analysis via factors (4) and (5).344
While Section 10(b) only applies domestically, domestic activity in this
context must be viewed as a range rather than a clear-cut answer. On one extreme
of the spectrum lies a securities transaction of a security listed on the New York
Stock Exchange between two U.S. companies. On the extraterritorial end of the
spectrum is a foreign cubed action.345 The Spectrum test allows courts to set the
boundaries in that range and determine when a transaction that invoked
irrevocable liability in the United States shifts out of the domestic transaction
area and into the extraterritorial area of the range.
Thus, the Spectrum test proceeds as follows: First, apply the Morrison twostep analysis. Then, after transitioning to the second step, determine whether the
security is listed on a domestic exchange. If the security is not listed on a
domestic exchange, then establish whether irrevocable liability occurred in the
United States. If irrevocable liability did occur in the United States, then
determine whether significant foreign elements surround the transaction. If there
are significant foreign elements, then apply the Spectrum test. After weighing
the factors, a court concludes whether the transaction falls on the domestic side
of the spectrum or the extraterritorial side. If the transaction falls on the domestic

misrepresentations were made in the United States”), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247; Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992–93 (2d Cir. 1975) (analyzing Schoenbaum and Leasco in reaching its
conclusion of when “the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws” apply), abrogated by Morrison, 561
U.S. 247; Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (reasoning that combining the tests from
Schoenbaum and Leasco provides “a better picture of whether there is sufficient United States involvement to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American court”), abrogated by Morrison, 561 U.S. 247; Morrison, 561
U.S. at 257 (recounting Schoenbaum’s and Leasco’s contribution to the Second Circuit’s development of Section
10(b) jurisprudence).
344 “International comity is deference to foreign government actors that is not required by international law
but is incorporated in domestic law.” William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 2071, 2078 (2015) (emphasis omitted). The Supreme Court recognizes that “[l]ike the United States,
foreign countries regulate their domestic securities exchanges and securities transactions occurring within their
territorial jurisdiction.” Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269. It also acknowledges that “the regulation of other countries
often differs from ours as to what constitutes fraud, what disclosures must be made, what damages are
recoverable, what discovery is available in litigation, what individual actions may be joined in a single suit, what
attorney’s fees are recoverable, and many other matters.” Id.
345 A “foreign cubed action” is an action brought by foreign plaintiffs in a U.S. court against a foreign issuer
for violations of U.S. securities laws regarding securities transactions that occurred in foreign countries. United
States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 283 n.11).
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side of the spectrum, then it is a domestic transaction, and Section 10(b) applies.
However, if the transaction falls on the extraterritorial side, then it is an
extraterritorial transaction, and Section 10(b) does not apply.
B. Spectrum Test in Action
Applying the Spectrum test to the facts of Parkcentral and Morrone—two
of the cases discussed in Part IV—demonstrates its operation and capability in
allowing courts to set the boundaries of the range identifying whether a
transaction should be considered domestic under Morrison.346 A transaction in
a security listed on a domestic exchange is on the domestic extreme of the
spectrum, and a foreign cubed action marks the extraterritorial extreme. The Part
IV cases lie between these two extremes because they involved more domestic
conduct than a foreign cubed action but did not involve securities listed on a
domestic exchange.347
The first step of the new framework, the Morrison two-step, can be applied
to both Parkcentral and Morrone because they are disputes about Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act. The Securities Exchange Act does not overcome
the presumption against extraterritoriality, so Section 10(b) will only apply
domestically, and the cases must be evaluated under Morrison’s second step. To
evaluate under Morrison’s second step, its two-prong Transactional test must be
applied. The first prong of the Transactional test—transactions in securities
listed on a domestic exchange—can also be resolved for both cases because
neither of them involved securities listed on a domestic exchange. Thus,
Parkcentral and Morrone must be evaluated under the Transactional test’s
second prong to determine whether a domestic transaction exists. The analysis
for each case begins with determining whether the irrevocable liability threshold
requirement is met and, if so, continues to the Spectrum test. The following
application of the Spectrum test begins with the case that lies closer to the
extraterritorial extreme of the spectrum and ends with the case that lies toward
the domestic extreme of the spectrum.
1. Application to Parkcentral
First, in Parkcentral, irrevocable liability occurred in the United States
because the United States is where the swap agreements were executed and the

346 While the Spectrum test will be applied to the cases retrospectively, the analysis will identify relevant
facts that courts can rely on for future application of the test.
347 See supra Part IV.
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parties became bound to the contracts.348 Even though Porsche was not a party
to the swap agreements and the underlying Volkswagen stock was listed on a
German exchange,349 this alone does not preclude Section 10(b)’s application
because Porsche’s fraudulent conduct was arguably in connection with the
purchase of the swap agreements—a type of agreement which Section 10(b)
explicitly covers.350
As the Second Circuit noted, significant foreign elements surrounded this
transaction.351 First, Porsche did not take significant steps in the United States
to further the fraudulent securities transactions because its fraudulent public
statements were made primarily in Germany and did not directly influence the
private transactions.352 Therefore, this factor weighs against a domestic
transaction and is in favor of an extraterritorial transaction. Second, Porsche’s
public statements did have significant effects on American investors and the
U.S. stock market because “parties with short positions in [Volkswagen’s stock]
. . . lost an estimated total of $38.1 billion.”353 This factor weighs in favor of a
domestic transaction and against an extraterritorial transaction. Third, because
the primary goals of U.S. securities regulation are to protect investors and protect
American confidence in the U.S. securities market,354 and the investment loss
was large, the United States did have some interest in applying Section 10(b)
liability to Porsche. However, the U.S. interest was low because the investors in
the swap agreements should bear some of the risks that come with purchasing
derivative securities deriving their value from a foreign stock that is not listed
on a domestic exchange. This factor is neutral, and weighs neither for nor against
a domestic or extraterritorial transaction.
Fourth, considering the widespread reputation of Porsche, the publicity
surrounding its public statements, and the mass losses incurred by investors, it
was very likely that German authorities would investigate the issue, and, in fact,
they did.355 Thus, the probability was high that the application of Section 10(b)
would conflict with German securities laws; this factor weighs against a
domestic transaction and is in favor of an extraterritorial transaction. Fifth,
348

See Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 2014).
See id.
350 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or
any securities-based swap agreement . . . .”).
351 Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 207.
352 See id.
353 Id. at 205.
354 See supra Part I.
355 Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 205.
349

2022]

A WOLF HUNT OFF WALL STREET

483

Germany had a strong interest in regulating Porsche because the misconduct
occurred in Germany, and the underlying stock in the swap agreement was
traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.356 Germany regulates and implements
sanctions regarding stocks traded on its exchange, so the magnitude of the
conflict between German securities laws and Section 10(b) would have been
great.357 This factor also weighs against a domestic transaction and is in favor of
an extraterritorial transaction. After weighing the factors, the foreign elements
of the transaction overcome the domestic elements, rendering it an
extraterritorial transaction and precluding Section 10(b)’s applicability. 358
2. Application to Morrone
Second, in Morrone, irrevocable liability occurred in the United States
because the subscription agreements for the Delaware corporation stock were
executed in Boston and the shares were issued to the investors from Boston. 359
Although the threshold irrevocable liability requirement is met, significant
foreign elements surround the transaction because the U.S. defendants used a
foreign broker to push the shares on foreign investors generally located in the
United Kingdom360 and Europe.361
First, the American defendants in Morrone took significant steps in the
United States that had a direct link to the fraudulent transactions because they:
(a) executed the transactions in the United States; (b) issued the shares from the
United States; (c) employed a foreign broker and prepared call scripts for the
boiler room tactics while in the United States; and (d) used the investors’ funds
in connection with the transaction to pay themselves imprudent fees as part of

356

See id. at 207.
“The Hessian Stock Exchange Supervisory Authority is responsible for market and legal supervision of
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.” Exchange Supervisory Authority of the State Hesse, BÖRSE FRANKFURT,
https://www.boerse-frankfurt.de/en/know-how/about/organisation-der-boerse/hessische-boersenaufsicht (last
visited Jan. 2, 2022). “To ensure proper exchange trading, the Exchange Supervisory Authority cooperates
closely with the exchange trading supervisory authorities and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority
(BaFin).” Id. “[T]he Exchange Supervisory Authority may impose sanctions against market participants.” Id.
358
Notably, the Second Circuit also rendered Section 10(b) inapplicable when it adjudicated the case. See
Parkcentral, 763 F.3d at 216 (“[W]e think it clear that the claims in this case are so predominantly foreign as to
be impermissibly extraterritorial.”).
359 See SEC v. Morrone, 997 F.3d 52, 60 (1st Cir. 2021).
360 See Complaint at 17, SEC v. Morrone, No. 1:12CV11669 (D. Mass. 2019). “The Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) regulates the financial services industry in the UK. Its role includes protecting consumers,
keeping the industry stable, and promoting healthy competition between financial service providers.” Financial
Conduct Authority, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/financial-conduct-authority (last
visited Jan. 2, 2022).
361 See Morrone, 997 F.3d at 56.
357
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the scheme while in the United States.362 Therefore, this factor weighs in favor
of a domestic transaction and against an extraterritorial transaction.
Second, the transactions did not have significant effects on either American
investors or the U.S. stock market because the scheme targeted foreign investors
in the United Kingdom363 and Europe.364 As a result, this factor weighs against
a domestic transaction and is in favor of an extraterritorial transaction. Third,
although the transactions did not directly affect U.S. investors, the United States
still had a strong interest in exercising its judicial resources over this case
because significant fraudulent conduct occurred in the United States, 365 which
negatively affects American confidence in the U.S. securities market.
Additionally, before the American defendants looked abroad to raise funds, they
first tried to execute the scheme domestically but were prevented by various U.S.
state authorities.366 This demonstrates that the United States already had a strong
interest in the case and maintained an interest to see the case through to
resolution. This factor weighs in favor of a domestic exchange and against an
extraterritorial transaction.
Fourth, it was not likely that foreign authorities would investigate the issue
because the American defendants implemented aggressive boiler room tactics to
raise millions of dollars from private-foreign investors over a two-year period
without interruption despite the American defendants receiving “numerous
complaints” about their tactics.367 Indeed, the foreign authorities had ample
opportunity to investigate but failed to do so. Moreover, by targeting private
investors with a non-publicly traded stock, the American defendants likely kept
the transactions discrete, concealing the transactions from foreign authorities.368
Thus, the probability of a conflict with other countries’ securities laws was low;
this factor weighs in favor of a domestic transaction and against an
extraterritorial transaction.
Fifth, European countries did have an interest in regulating these transactions
insofar as protecting their investors from fraudulent conduct that occurred
abroad. However, the interest was weak because it was not a stock traded on a
foreign exchange or widely traded in the foreign countries.369 Thus, the
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369

Id. at 57, 60.
See Complaint, supra note 360.
See Morrone, 997 F.3d at 56.
See id. at 57, 60.
See id. at 55–56.
See id. at 56–58.
See id. at 56 (employing call centers to target investors in Europe).
See id. at 57–58, 61.
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magnitude of any conflict that Section 10(b) liability would cause with other
countries’ securities laws is low. This factor weighs in favor of a domestic
transaction. After weighing the factors, the domestic elements of the transaction
overcome the foreign elements, rendering it a domestic transaction and
permitting Section 10(b) applicability.370
As demonstrated, the Spectrum test takes into account the totality of the
circumstances while maintaining focus on the transaction. The examples above
produce the same outcomes that the circuit courts reached371 using similar facts
but with a more structured analysis that can be consistently applied. This
consistent analysis can resolve the circuit split and prevent further exacerbation
by the rest of the circuit courts when the issue is presented to them in the near
future. This issue in securities law has plagued the federal courts for decades,
only to worsen with the adjudication of Morrison and enactment of the DoddFrank Act. It is time to mend the split.
CONCLUSION
Morrison left open what constitutes a domestic transaction. Alone, the
Irrevocable Liability test is too narrow to properly encompass the elusive
distinction between domestic and foreign conduct—particularly in the context
of an extensive list of regulated securities that allocate many different interests
among parties. As for the So Predominantly Foreign test, the Second Circuit
identifies compelling concerns but uses clever wordplay to address them in a
manner that contradicts Morrison.372
As demonstrated, the Spectrum test provides a solution to these deficiencies
with a framework that adheres to stare decisis—upholding confidence and
tradition in the judicial system. Importantly, the test does so while providing a
workable analysis that will resolve confusion in the lower courts and facilitate
the development of Section 10(b) jurisprudence. A rapidly developing securities
market demands a flexible test that can continually adapt to it and resolve
international conflicts that accompany a globalizing securities market.

370

Notably, the First Circuit also rendered Section 10(b) applicable when it adjudicated the case. See id. at

61.
371 See Parkcentral Glob. Hub Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 216 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e
think it clear that the claims in this case are so predominantly foreign as to be impermissibly extraterritorial.”);
Morrone, 997 F.3d at 61.
372 See Stoyas v. Toshiba Corp., 896 F.3d 933, 950 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he principal reason that we should
not follow the Parkcentral decision is because it is contrary to Section 10(b) and Morrison itself.”).
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This Comment petitions Congress to step in once again and resolve these
issues. In Section 10(b) extraterritorial cases, there is inconsistency among the
circuit courts in applying Morrison’s second prong of its Transactional test, and
potentially another circuit split arising from the Dodd-Frank issue.
Congressional action implementing this Spectrum test to both public and private
actions will end the circuit splits, preserve judicial resources, uphold stare
decisis, prevent plaintiffs from turning away from a defendant-friendly Second
Circuit, 373 and protect international comity.
RADLEY GILLIS*

373 The circuit split incentivizes private plaintiffs in these cases to forum shop. Mason v. Cont’l Grp., Inc.,
474 U.S. 1087, 1087–88 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that, because circuit differences in rules “may
have the troubling effect of encouraging forum shopping by plaintiffs[,]” the “conflict among the Circuits . . .
can hardly be passed over as an unimportant one unworthy of this Court’s attention”). Plaintiffs will avoid a
defendant-friendly Second Circuit and turn toward the First and the Ninth Circuits. See Halper et al., supra note
15 (“[I]t is likely that private plaintiffs asserting claims with a foreign nexus will do their best to bypass the
Second Circuit and file suit in more hospitable forums, such as the First and Ninth Circuits.”). These latter
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